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INTERPRETING REGULATIONS
Kevin M. Stack*
The age of statutes has given way to an era of regulations, but our jurisprudence has fallen behind. Despite the centrality of regulations to law,
courts have no intelligible approach to regulatory interpretation.The neglect of regulatory interpretationis not only a shortcoming in interpretive
theory but also a practicalproblem for administrative law. Canonicaldoctrines of administrative law-Chevron, Seminole Rock/Auer, and
Accardi-involve interpretingregulations, and yet courts lack a consistent
approach.
This Article develops a methodfor interpretingregulationsand, more generally, situates regulatory interpretation within debates over legal
interpretation.It argues that a purposive approach, not a textualist one,
best suits the distinctive legal characterof regulations.Administrative law
requires agencies to produce detailed explanations of the groundsfor their
regulations, called statements of basis and purpose. Courts routinely use
these statements to assess the validity of regulations. This Article argues
that these statements should guide judicial interpretationof regulationsas
well. By relying on these statements as privileged sources for interpretation, courts not only grant deference to agencies but also treat these
statements as creating commitments with respect to a regulation's meaning. This approachjustifies a frameworkfor interpreting regulations under
Chevron, Seminole Rock/Auer, and Accardi that is consistent with the deferential grounding of these doctrines, and provides more notice to those
regulatedthan does relying on the regulation'stext alone.
This Article also shows how regulatory purposivism constitutes a new
foothold for Henry Hart and Albert Sacks's classic legal process account
of purposivism. Hart and Sacks's theory is vulnerable to the criticism that
discerning statutory purpose is elusive because statutes do not often include enacted statements of purpose. Regulatory purposivism, however
avoids this concern because statements of basis and purpose offer a consistent and reliable source for discerning a regulation'spurpose. From this
perspective, the best days for Hart and Sacks's legal process theory may be
ahead.
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. I am grateful to Mark Brandon, Richard Bierschbach, Lisa Schultz Bressman, Edward Cheng, William Eskridge, David
Franklin, Abbe Gluck, Andrew Hessick, Margaret Lemos, Anne Marie Lofaso, David Lewis,
Gillian Metzger, Robert Mikos, Max Minzner, Jeffrey Pojanowski, Alex Reinhardt, Daniel
Sharfstein, Peter Strauss, Ingrid Wuerth, and to participants in workshops at Arizona State
University College of Law, Columbia Law School, University of West Virginia College of
Law, and the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Vanderbilt University for
comments on earlier drafts. For outstanding research assistance, I am grateful to John Ablan,
Valisa Berber-Thayer, Michaela Jackson, Jason Soward, and Rachel Weissharr.
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INTRODUCTION

As statutes gradually supplanted the common law during the twentieth
century,1 lawyers and judges devoted increasing attention to methods of

statutory interpretation. By the century's end, statutory interpretation had
ballooned into one of the most contested issues in judicial practice and
scholarly debate. 2 The ascendance of statutory interpretation occurred, howl. For a classic expression, see Guino CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 1 & 183 n.1 (1982), who notes that "[a]ll agree that modem American law is dominated by statutes."
2. For a concise overview of the debate, see Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism,
119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1761-68 (2010).
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ever, as regulations issued by administrative agencies eclipsed statutes as
sources of law.3 With the rise of regulations, lawyers and judges now rou-

tinely confront questions of interpretation on this next frontier-that is, the
interpretation of regulations themselves.
While all agree that regulations are primary sources of law, strikingly
little attention has been devoted to the method of their interpretation.
Courts and scholars have labored over legal interpretation generally and

the methodology for statutory interpretation in particular. But regulations-specifically, the rules that administrative agencies produce largely
through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process 4 -have been orphaned
from those debates. Administrative law has done no better in attending to
the interpretation of regulations. Administrative law specifies how agencies

must make regulations-that is, the procedural requirements for rulemaking. 5 And courts and commentators have devoted tremendous attention to
3.

See

CORNELIUS

M.

KERWIN & SCOTT

R.

FURLONG, RULEMAKING

13-21 (4th ed.

2011) (documenting, in terms of the number of rules and pages in the Federal Register devoted to federal regulations, a level of production of regulations beginning in the 1970s that far
exceeds comparable measures for statutes).
4. By "regulations:' my primary reference is to rules that administrative agencies issue
through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process provided in the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"). See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006); id. § 551(4) (defining "rules"). These notice-andcomment or "legislative" rules are legally binding, see 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

§ 6.3 (5th ed. 2010), and have long been viewed as the most

significant category of agency rule. While my exposition focuses on notice-and-comment rules,
my analysis also applies to other types of legally binding administrative rules, including rules
produced through the APA's formal rulemaking procedures, direct final rules, and interim final
rules. See Ronald M. Levin, Direct Final Rulemaking, 64 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1, 16-18
(1995) (describing the use of direct final rules); Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of
Rulemaking: An Empirical Portraitof the Modem Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889,
901, 902 & n.33, 903, 931 (2008) (describing formal rulemaking, direct final rules, and
interim final rules, and documenting use of the latter two). These types of rules are issued with
a statement of their grounds that is the substantial equivalent to the "statement of basis and
purpose" required for notice-and-comment rules. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (statement of basis
and purpose required in notice-and-comment rulemaking); 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3) (statement of
reasons required in formal rulemaking); Levin, supra, at 18 (noting that direct final rules are
issued with a statement of reasons that is the substantial equivalent to a statement of basis and

purpose in a notice-and-comment proceeding);

NAT'L

ARCHIVES

&

RECORDS

ADMIN.,

2-6 to 2-8 (1998), available at
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/write/handbook/ddh.pdf (noting that interim final rules
and direct final rules should include preambles, including explanation of the grounds for the
rule and the rule's purposes). I do not address the interpretation of rules that are not legally
binding, called nonlegislative rules, such as interpretative rules, guidance documents, and
general policy statements. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (providing exception to notice-andcomment requirements for these documents); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302
n.31 (1979) (interpreting the Attorney General's manual on the APA to suggest that
interpretative rules do not have the force of law); Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037,
1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same).
5. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (stating the default requirements for notice-and-comment
rulemaking); id. §§ 556-557 (stating the default requirements for formal rulemaking).
FEDERAL

REGISTER

DOCUMENT DRAFTING

HANDBOOK
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refining the standards for judging the validity of regulations.6 But theorizing about how a court-or any other legal actor, for that matter-should
interpret regulations has attracted only occasional notice,7 especially in
comparison to the volume of legal work devoted to figuring out how to

comply with regulations. We lack a debate over, much less an account of,
the basic elements of regulatory interpretation, including "the overall goal
of interpretation, '8 "the admissible sources the interpreter may consider in

attempting to achieve that goal,"9 and the relationships among those sources.
The lack of attention to judicial methods of regulatory interpretation is

more than a shortcoming in interpretive theory. It is also a practical problem
for administrative law and lawyers who grapple with regulations. Several
central doctrines of administrative law depend on courts interpreting regula-

tions. Under Chevron, a court must interpret the regulation to judge whether
it is permitted under the agency's authorizing statute,10 just as a court must
interpret a statute to judge its constitutionality. Under Seminole Rock/Auer, a
6. Both the Chevron doctrine and arbitrariness review under State Farm provide standards for courts reviewing the validity of agency action, including agency regulations. See
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (articulating the framework for evaluating the validity of an agency's interpretation of a statute applicable
in review of agency regulations); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (providing the canonical statement of the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard applied in review of agency rulemaking); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (setting forth
standards for judicial review of the validity of agency action).
7. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretationsof Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 688 n.359 (1996) ("Detailed
consideration of the relative legitimacy and utility of particular approaches to [regulatory
interpretation] is for another day."). The most helpful descriptive accounts are more than a
generation out of date. Frank C. Newman's How Courts Interpret Regulations, 35 CALIF. L.
REV. 509 (1947), bursts with insight and charm but addressed a legal landscape in the early
days following the New Deal, one year after the enactment of the APA. Russell L. Weaver's
Judicial Interpretationof Administrative Regulations: An Overview, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 681
(1984), usefully surveys examples of courts adopting a variety of approaches to regulatory
interpretation the same year Chevron was decided. Among efforts to defend elements of a
theory of regulatory interpretation, I have found the most useful to be Manning, supra, note
(challenging Seminole Rock deference and proposing a model of independent judicial evaluation of regulations that would place greater reliance on agencies' explanatory statements), and
Lars Noah's Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a "Legislative History" of Agency
Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 306-22 (2000) (arguing that courts should pay more attention to
original agency intention and suggesting a hierarchy of sources to do so). This Article defends
a theory of interpretation that is different from these scholars' contributions in substance-by
offering a purposivist theory-and in scope-by developing a general theory of regulatory
interpretation and adapting that theory to fit the demands of current administrative law doctines. While I point out my departures from their views, I also attend to common ground and
ways in which I rely on, and seek to build on, their contributions.
8. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
211 (2000).
9. ESKRIDGE, supra note 8 (suggesting a distinction between the goal of statutory
interpretation and the admissible sources the interpreter may consider); see also Caleb Nelson,
What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REv. 347, 351-53 (2005) (invoking this distinction in a comparison between textualism and intentionalism in statutory interpretation).
10. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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court must interpret the regulation to determine whether the agency's preferred construction is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation."" Likewise, under the Accardi principle, 12 a court cannot de-

termine whether an agency has failed to comply with its own regulation
without interpreting the regulation itself. How a court interprets the regulation at issue can decide the outcome under these doctrines.
Yet courts have not developed a consistent approach to regulatory interpretation under these doctrines or elsewhere. Decisions sometimes rely
exclusively on the regulation's text 13 and canons of construction,"' but in15

other instances courts invoke aspects of the regulation's procedural history,

11.
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This doctrine was traditionally
associated with Seminole Rock, but since 1997 the Supreme Court and other courts have frequently attributed it to Auer, see, e.g., Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254,
2265-66 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Seminole Rock doctrine has recently
been attributed to Auer), despite the fact that Auer involved a straightforward application of
Seminole Rock, see Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (relying on Seminole Rock with little ado). Because
I discuss some decisions rendered before Auer, I refer to the doctrine under its longstanding
name Seminole Rock, but my reference to the Seminole Rock doctrine includes its progeny that
has been attributed to Auer. For emphasis or to accord with the usage of some sources, I occasionally refer to this doctrine as Seminole RockAuer.
12. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) (standing for the
proposition that agencies must comply with their own regulations).
13. See, e.g., Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011) (concluding
that the regulatory phrase "change in terms" is "ambiguous as to the question presented" because the "text alone does not permit a more definitive reading"); Auer, 519 U.S. at 461
(concluding that the phrase "subject to" bears the meaning the Secretary assigned to it based
on this text and two dictionary definitions); Actavis Elizabeth LLC v. FDA, 625 F.3d 760, 763
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (concluding that the phrase "active moiety" and its regulatory definition supported the Food and Drug Administration's grant of five-year exclusivity to a drug because the
agency's "interpretation [was] squarely within the language of its regulations"); Howmet
Corp. v. EPA, 614 F.3d 544, 548-50 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (construing a regulation as ambiguous
based on a textual reading of the phrase "purpose for which it was produced").
14. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644,
668-69 (2007) (invoking the canon against surplusage in interpretation of regulation); Long
Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170 (2007) (invoking the canon that the
specific governs the general); Fabi Constr. Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 508 F.3d 1077, 1087 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (relying on noscitur a sociis as part of determination that the plain meaning of
"form work" precludes the agency's interpretation of the regulation); Sec'y of Labor v. Twentymile Coal Co., 411 F.3d 256, 260-61 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("To read the regulation's use of the
term... [in this way] would lead to absurd results .... This Court will not adopt an interpretation of a statute or regulation when such an interpretation would render the particular law
meaningless.").
15. Compare, e.g., Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 428 n.14 (1988) (concluding
that a final rule inadvertently dropped the word "recipient" from the phrase "applicant or recipient," which appeared in the notice of proposed rulemaking, and reading "recipient" back
into the final rule in view of the Secretary's comments and the "history of these regulations"
(emphasis omitted)), with, e.g., Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 659 (declining to read "discretionary" broadly to include all agency actions required by statute because the phrase in the final
rule "all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control" replaced the
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the court's construction of the authorizing statute's purposes or congressional intent, 6 or the agency's own justification for the regulation,17 among other
tools. 18 Courts not only lack a consistent approach but also generally invoke
one interpretive tool or another without stating reasons for doing so-nor
manifesting a compunction to consider how similar interpretive issues have
been handled in the past. ' 9 As a result, little law or considered practice on interpretive methodology applicable to regulations is developing. Indeed, it is
hard to avoid the impression that the judiciary does not recognize regulatory
interpretation as an aspect of judicial practice, like statutory interpretation,
that merits independent and systematic consideration.2"
This Article develops a theory of regulatory interpretation to address this

gap in both interpretive theory and judicial practice. Regulations, it argues,
are particularly well suited to a purposive method of interpretation. The Article takes as a starting point that a theory of regulatory interpretation must
be grounded in the distinctive character of regulations and the institutions
that issue them. Regulations are creatures of administrative law, and distinctive features of that legal context suggest a purposive rather than a textualist
approach to interpretation. At the most basic level, to issue a regulation, administrative procedure and judicial doctrine require an agency to publish a
detailed explanation of the grounds and purposes of the regulation, called a
proposed phrase "all actions in which there is Federal involvement or control" (emphasis
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
16. See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 401-02 (2008) (rejecting
an interpretation of a regulation because it would be in "tension with the structure and purposes" of the authorizing statute); Coke, 551 U.S. at 169-70 (invoking congressional intent as a
basis for resolving a conflict between the literal reading of two regulations); Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (refusing to defer to
the Secretary's interpretation because it would force the Court "to conclude that [the Secretary] has not fulfilled her statutory duty"); Emery Mining Corp. v. Sec'y of Labor, 744 F.2d
1411, 1414 (10th Cir. 1984) ("[A] regulation must be interpreted so as to harmonize with and
further and not to conflict with the objective of the statute it implements." (quoting Trs. of Ind.
Univ. v. United States, 618 F.2d 736, 739 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
17. See, e.g., Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2260-65 (2011)
(relying on statement of basis and purpose to construe regulation); United States v. O'Hagan,
521 U.S. 642, 673-74 (1997) (construing Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") tender offer rule as a means "reasonably designed to prevent" fraudulent trading on material,
nonpublic information in the tender offer context based on SEC's justifications of the rule in
its statement of basis and purpose "as a means necessary and proper to assure the efficacy" of
the Williams Act); Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 53 (D.C. Cir.
1999) ("Although the preamble does not 'control' the meaning of the regulation, it may serve
as a source of evidence concerning contemporaneous agency intent."); Sec'y of Labor, Mine
Safety & Health Admin. ex rel. Bushnell v. Cannelton Indus., Inc., 867 F2d 1432, 1438-39
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (relying on statement of basis and purpose to construe regulation).
18. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 117
F.3d 596, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (relying on industry experts' definition of "generally accepted
accounting principles" in approving agency's construction of its regulation).
19. See infra Sections I.A-C (providing account of this practice).
20. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation:Methodology
as "Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1909-18 (2011) (examining the uncertain legal status of principles of statutory interpretative methodology).
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"statement of basis and purpose,' ' 2 1 also referred to as a regulatory "preamble. '22 Congress, in contrast, faces no analogous requirement to include a
statement of purpose in its legislation, and enacts such statements in a minority of statutes. 23 Moreover, when courts judge the validity of regulations,
their task is not to determine if there is any conceivable basis for upholding
them, as courts do in constitutional review of legislation, but rather to ask

whether the agency articulated grounds in its statement of basis and purpose
on which the regulations may be upheld.2 4 As a result of these doctrines, the
text of a regulation and its statement of basis and purpose stand in a unique
relationship: together, they constitute the act of regulation, an act that is not
complete without either element of this couplet. Based on this premise, it

does not make sense to interpret the text of a regulation independently from
its statement of basis and purpose.
Now consider a further feature of regulations: like other forms of agency
action, a regulation must implement a statute's aims or goals within prescribed means. To be valid, a regulation must be purposive in the sense that
it implements, or carries into effect, the authorizing statute.2 5 Here again, the
contrast with legislation is sharp. Whereas Congress can select its own ends
so long as they are constitutionally legitimate, 26 administrative agencies'

aims are prescribed by statute. Based on the premise that regulations must
be purposive in this sense of carrying into effect the agency's statutory aims,
it makes sense to read them in light of their purposes. Bringing these observations together suggests the outlines of an interpretive method: that a
regulation should be read in light of its purposes, with the regulation's text
21. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) ("[Tjhe agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a
concise general statement of their basis and purpose.").
22. The term "preamble," while widely used by courts, the government, and commentators, is misleading. As explained below, these statements typically include highly specific
justifications of the choices made by the agency, the alternatives considered, responses to
comments, the aims the agency sought to achieve, among many other things, not the spare
statement of grounds connoted by the term "preamble." See infra text accompanying notes
200-209. I accordingly use the APA's term "statement[s] of basis and purpose." See supra note
21 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 197 (documenting infrequent use of statements of purpose in recent
Congresses).
24. See Kevin M. Stack, The ConstitutionalFoundation of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952,
960-71 (2007) (documenting settled rule of administrative law that courts uphold agency rules
only on grounds provided by the agency at the time the agency issued the rules in its explanatory statements, and contrasting this rule of review to that of constitutional law); see also infra
Section 11.B (examining this requirement).
25. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) ("The legislative power of
the United States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority by
government departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress and subject to limitations which that body imposes."); infra Section ll.B (providing an
account of this feature in relation to constitutional requirements of delegation).
26. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956-57 (2010) (reaffirming a broad
formulation of the Necessary and Proper Clause's grant of power to Congress to pursue any
"legitimate end" through means "plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited") (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
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and the statement of basis and purpose constituting the privileged interpretive sources.
From these premises grounded in the distinctive character of regulations,
this Article builds on Henry Hart and Albert Sacks's classic exposition of a
purposive theory in The Legal Process27 to develop the interpretive ap-

proach. Seeking a foothold in Hart and Sacks's theory might seem curious
given that their approach to statutory interpretation has been under attack for
decades.2 8 Commentators routinely distill Hart and Sacks's view to the pre-

scription that courts interpret statutes under the presumption that the
legislature is "made of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes
reasonably." 29 Critics view that presumption as too optimistic a premise for
30
a theory of statutory interpretation.
But this shorthand account neglects Hart and Sacks's emphasis on enacted sources for discerning statutory purpose and their justification for
doing so. A rarely noticed but critical element of their approach is that the
court's first step in attributing purpose to a statute is to "accept[]" any "formally enacted statement of purpose in a statute,"'3' and only if such a
statement is unavailable or unavailing should the court engage in the broader
inference of purpose for which their theory is so well known.32 Once the
place of enacted statements of purpose in Hart and Sacks's approach comes
into view, it also becomes clear how their theory provides a model for pur27. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
28. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV.
20, 26-28 (1988) (noting that the "three decades of near hegemony" enjoyed by Hart and
Sacks's legal process theory ended with public choice and judicial restraint critiques); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23-24, 29-30 (2006)
(suggesting that few judges and scholars embrace the strong purposivism associated with Hart
and Sacks's views, which were primary subjects of textualist critiques in the 1980s and
1990s); Robert Post, Theorizing Disagreement: Reconceiving the Relationship Between Law
and Politics, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1319, 1333-35 (2010) (noting that Hart and Sacks's legal
process approach declined after the 1960s); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the
Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393,
1398-402 (1996) (describing public choice theory of the legislature, law and economics,
and critical legal studies as all contributing to unseating legal process thought from the
1970s through 1990s).
29. HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1378.
30. Examples of this reading of Hart and Sacks are legion. See, e.g., Victoria Nourse,
Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the SupermajoritarianDifficulty, and
the Separation of Powers, 99 GEo. L.J. 1119, 1122, 1148 (2011) (characterizing Hart and
Sacks's theory as based on a presumption that the legislature is made of "reasonable persons
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably" and criticizing that presumption as an unrealistically rosy view of the legislature); Post, supra note 28, at 1335 & n.91 (arguing that the legal
process school was founded on the presumption that legislatures should be regarded as "reasonable persons who use law to attain reasonable ends," and citing Hart and Sacks's
"reasonable persons" passage).

31.

HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1377.
32. See id. ("In all other situations, the purpose of a statute has in some degree to be
inferred.").
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posive regulatory interpretation. An agency's statement of basis and purpose, like a statute's enacted statement of purpose, provides an authoritative
statement of purposes issued on behalf of the institution, and thus constitutes a privileged interpretive source. From this perspective, Hart and
Sacks's theory may hold its greatest promise with regard to legal sources
that they largely overlooked-regulations.
So understood, this regulatory purposivism avoids the significant
objections textualists have mounted against purpose-based theories of
statutory interpretation. With regard to statutes, textualists have argued that
purposive theories require a dubious attribution of a single set of purposes to
a multimember body, undermine fair notice, and give courts poor guidance
in determining the level of generality of legislative compromise.33 With
regard to regulations, the agency itself, not a subgroup of its members,
issues statements of basis and purpose; these statements generally provide
detailed explanation of the regulation's provisions and its overall purposes.
By relying on these statements along with the regulation's text, purpose is
not only coherent but also more easily ascertainable for regulations.
Importantly, this purposive approach to regulatory interpretationreading a regulation's text in light of the purposes set forth in the statement
of basis and purpose and as inferred from the text-justifies a consistent
framework for courts to use when interpreting regulations under central administrative law doctrines, including Chevron, Seminole Rock/Auer, and
Accardi. When faced with regulatory interpretation under each of these
doctrines, the purposive approach makes the critical inquiries whether the
interpretation is (1) permitted by the regulation's text and (2) consistent
with the regulation's purposes, as set forth in the statement of basis and
purpose and the regulation's text. This two-prong framework rationalizes
the approach to regulatory interpretation under these administrative law
doctrines. It also strikes an appealing balance between deference to the
agency and fair notice of the meaning of regulations. On the one hand, it
constrains the scope of permissible interpretations of the regulation more
narrowly than asking only what constitutes a permissible construction of the
text, and accordingly provides greater notice of the regulation's meaning. On
the other hand, the approach also grants deference to the agency in the strong
form of judicial acceptance of the agency's most elaborate disquisition on the
regulation's purposes. By treating the grounds the agency invokes to justify
and explain its regulation as creating commitments with respect to the regulation's meaning, this method distinguishes between deference to the agency's
interpretive judgments-which it grants-and the agency's flexibility to
alter its interpretations in ways inconsistent with the grounds it invoked to
justify them-which it constrains.
Developing a theory of regulatory interpretation is not only overdue but
also particularly timely. The Supreme Court, the president, and agencies are
beginning to struggle more explicitly with regulatory interpretation. Justice
Scalia, for instance, recently announced his interest in revisiting Seminole
33.

See infra Section IV.D (addressing textualist challenges).
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Rock deference based on John Manning's critique of the doctrine.34 Seminole Rock requires a court to accept an agency's interpretation of its own
regulation so long as the agency's construction is not "plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation. '35 While the application of Seminole Rock
requires interpreting regulations, if Seminole Rock were to be overruled, the
need for a theory of regulatory interpretation would be all the more pressing.
More generally, over the past several years, there has been a lively debate
about federal agencies' powers to preempt state law.3 6 One central question
in that debate is the relevance of an agency's own statement of preemption
in a regulation's statement of basis and purpose. Agencies' practice of en37
gaging in so-called "preemption by preamble" has attracted notice,
culminating in President Obama issuing a memorandum directing agencies
not to include preemptive statements in their preambles. 3a The debate
about the import of agency statements on preemption in regulatory preambles has not, however, been grounded in a general approach to regulatory
interpretation.3 9 Given the prominence of regulations, these issues are leading indications of an unresolved and fundamental issue, not isolated events.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I motivates the inquiry by ex-

plaining how central doctrines in administrative law-Chevron, Seminole
34. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that he would be receptive to reconsidering Auer deference and noting that
defects of Auer are fully explored in Manning, supra note 7); see also Christopher v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 (2012) (noting that Auer deference can
"frustrat[e] the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking' citing Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Talk America).
35. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
36. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A PresumptionAgainst Agency Preemption, 102 Nw.
U. L. REv. 695, 699 (2008) (arguing that courts should apply a presumption against agency
decision to preempt); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemptionand InstitutionalChoice, 102 Nw. U. L.
REv. 727, 767 (2008) (suggesting that a super-strong clear statement rule is required for agencies to preempt on their own authority); Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U.
L. REv. 869, 894-900 (2008) (arguing for restricting agencies' power to issue regulations that
preempt state law and considering several possible clear statement canons).
37. Compare Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: "Agency-Forcing"
Measures, 58 DuKE L.J. 2125, 2179 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, FederalismAccountability]
(arguing that courts can force agencies to engage in preemption decisions by conditioning
deference on whether preemption statements have gone through notice-and-comment procedures), and Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalizationof Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 227, 256-57 (2007) (suggesting that courts
could incentivize agencies to engage with preemption issues by requiring notice-and-comment
periods for preemption statements), with Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New
Federalism, 57 DuKE L.J. 2023, 2103-04 (2008) (arguing enforcement of explanation requirements in administrative law provides practical way of enforcing federalism concerns
raised by administrative preemption).
38. Memorandum on Preemption, 2009 DAILY COMP. PREs. Doc. 384 (May 20, 2009).
39. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 449, 496 (2008) (defending agency reference model for
courts deciding whether federal regulatory regimes preempt state law, but not distinguishing
between agency preemption statements in amicus briefs and preambles for the purposes of
making this determination).
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Rock, and Accardi-requirecourts to interpret regulations, yet courts lack a
consistent approach. The central body of the Article, encompassing Parts II,
III, and IV, articulates and defends a purposive theory of regulatory interpretation. Part II argues that well-established aspects of American
administrative law suggest a purposive approach, Part III provides an account of Hart and Sacks's legal process purposivism, and Part IV shows how
Hart and Sacks's theory provides a framework for purposive regulatory interpretation. Part IV also argues that this approach provides an attractive
conception of deference, one that induces agency deliberation 40 and responds to textualist critics of purposivism as a theory of statutory
interpretation. Part V argues that this purposive technique provides a framework that meets the demands for regulatory interpretation under Chevron,
Seminole Rock, and Accardi, and addresses scholarly concerns about the
operation of these doctrines. Part V also responds to practical objections that
this approach unduly constrains the agency's flexibility and creates unmanageable incentives for manipulation of the content of statements of basis and
purpose. In these ways, the Article aims to give jurisprudential consideration
to the interpretation of regulations in keeping with their prominent place in
our law.
I. THE INTERPRETATION OF REGULATIONS:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM

In the 1960s and 1970s, agencies increasingly turned to rulemaking to
implement their statutory powers. 41 Agency reliance on rulemaking has persisted. Today, the majority of agencies issue their most significant policies
through notice-and-comment rulemaking. 42 With the rise of rulemaking, it is
hard to deny a naive expectation, perhaps a reflection of a lingering nostalgia for a mechanical jurisprudence, that agency regulations would resolve
legal ambiguities, not create them. To be sure, many regulations clarify
legal obligations. But regulations are not unique among legal sources for their
lack of ambiguity or the obviousness of their interpretation. At times, regulations replicate statutory ambiguities; 43 in other instances, they create
40. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 265
(2010) (arguing that judicial review of agency action should induce deliberation).
41. See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 3, at 13-15 (documenting rise in production
of federal rules from 1960s through 1970s); Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 1139, 1147

(2001) (summarizing American Bar Association statistics showing that in 1960 agencies published, on average, 41 notices of proposed rulemaking per month, whereas in 1972 the average
jumped to 142 per month, and by 1974 it rose to over 190 per month, where it remained for
the rest of the decade).
42. See CURTIS

SERV., RL32240, THE FEDERAL
(suggesting that notice-and-comment rulemaking is central to the definition and implementation of policy).
W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH

RULEMAKING PROCESS: AN OVERVIEW 5 (2008)

43. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (concluding that, because
the regulation repeated critical statutory phrases, the question for the Court was the meaning
of the statutes', not the regulation's, terms).
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their own." Changed and unforeseen circumstances also unsettle the interpretation of regulations that had appeared to be clear.45

Agencies' profuse production of regulations has multiplied the occasions on which courts confront issues of regulatory interpretation. As I
explain in this Part, several doctrines of administrative law implicate regulatory interpretation. Courts must interpret a regulation to evaluate its validity
under the agency's authorizing statute (Chevron), to determine whether to

accept an agency's construction of its own regulation (Seminole Rock), and
to assess an agency's compliance with its own regulation (Accardi). Courts,
however, have not developed a consistent approach to regulatory interpretation under these doctrines or elsewhere.

This conclusion parallels Hart and Sacks's famous observation about
statutory interpretation: "The hard truth of the matter is that American
courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation. 4 6 Regulatory interpretation, however, raises a
further worry. As I illustrate below, courts typically devote scant attention to

justifying their approach to regulatory interpretation in relation to prior decisions and, as a result, little law or consistent practice has emerged.
A. Chevron's Silence

The Chevron doctrine provides a good starting point because it so clearly

illustrates

how little

attention

has been

devoted

to regulatory

interpretation. When a party challenges an agency's regulation as violating
the agency's authorizing statute, Chevron typically provides the framework
of review. 4 7 To review the validity of a regulation under Chevron,a4 the court
must interpret the regulation. But the Chevron doctrine provides no guid-

ance on how a court is to do so.
44. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tlhe Secretary has merely replaced statutory ambiguity with regulatory ambiguity"); Howmet Corp. v. EPA, 614 F.3d 544, 549-50 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (concluding that the
regulation's term "spent material" is ambiguous); Fabi Constr. Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 508 E3d
1077, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (concluding that the term "removal" in regulation is ambiguous).
45. See, e.g., MarkWest Mich. Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 646 E3d 30, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(concluding that the agency was "[c]onfronted with a scenario that its regulations did not
anticipate").
46. HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1169. Interestingly, a peer of Hart and Sacks's,
Professor Frank Newman, reached a very similar characterization of regulatory interpretation
by courts in 1947. Newman wrote, "An even more significant product of the failure to use
interpretive precedents is a hodgepodge of theories, rules, and cautions, all pertaining to regulations, that can now be exploited by opposing lawyers in almost every dispute." Newman,
supra note 7, at 525.
47. Recall that by regulations, I primarily refer to rules that are the products of noticeand-comment rulemaking. Under United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001),
notice-and-comment rules qualify for Chevron deference. See also, e.g., Long Is. Care at
Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173-74 (2007).
48.
(1984).

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
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To appreciate how application of Chevron requires regulatory interpretation, consider the elements of the Chevron inquiry. Doctrinally, courts
typically frame this inquiry in two steps. In Chevron's first step, the court
asks whether the statute clearly addresses "the precise question at issue."'4 9
In Chevron's second step, the court asks whether the agency's action is
"based on a permissible construction of the statute."5 Commentators have
long argued that step one and step two involve the same questions of statutory interpretation."' Regardless of whether the Chevron doctrine is viewed as
having two interpretive steps, as represented in long-standing judicial doctrine, or as a single inquiry into statutory permissibility, the point for our
purposes is the same: the reviewing court cannot determine whether an
agency has based its regulation on a permissible construction of the statute
without interpreting the regulation. An understanding of the regulation-an
interpretation of its meaning and application-is required to sensibly ask
whether the statute permits the regulation.
An analogy to constitutional review of federal legislation helps to highlight this fundamental point. When a court reviews the constitutionality of
federal legislation, it is commonplace that the court must interpret not only
the Constitution but also the statute. 52 Likewise, to judge the validity of a
49. Id. at 842.
50. Id. at 843.
51.
See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1253, 1260 (1997) ("The Court initially framed step two as a question of
whether the agency's interpretation is 'permissible,' but that phrasing was circular: obviously
an interpretation that is not permitted is prohibited." (footnote omitted)); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 599 (2009) ("The
single question is whether the agency's construction is permissible as a matter of statutory
interpretation; the two Chevron steps both ask this question, just in different ways. As a result,
the two steps are mutually convertible."). On this view, Chevron's second step should be abandoned or treated as equivalent to arbitrary and capricious review. See Levin, supra, at 1296
(concluding that step two should be conceived, as many courts treat it, as arbitrariness review);
M. Elizabeth Magill, Step Two of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in A GUIDE
TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 85, 101 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005) (arguing that there are not good reasons to view arbitrariness review
and Chevron step two as distinct). But see Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron's Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REv. 611, 623-24 (2009) (arguing that step two analysis includes
consideration of an agency's use of legal materials, such as legislative history and canons of
construction, that do not fit comfortably in traditional hard-look review). This past term, the
Supreme Court tersely endorsed the convergence of step two analysis and arbitrariness review
in a case at issue. See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) (stating that analysis
under Chevron step two and under arbitrary and capricious review "would be the same, because under Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is 'arbitrary or
capricious in substance.' ").
52. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (engaging in detailed statutory
interpretation in order to assess facial constitutionality of an act); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132,
148 (1976) ("[Iln the absence of an authoritative construction [of the statute], it is impossible to
define precisely the constitutional question presented."). Indeed, in the context of constitutional
review, well-established judicial doctrines explicitly mediate between constitutional norms and
statutory interpretation. The canon of constitutional avoidance, for instance, prompts a court to
avoid an interpretation of a statute that would render the statute unconstitutional, or even to
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regulation under an authorizing statute, the court must interpret not only the
statute but also the regulation. In both contexts, judging the consistency of
the lower-order law with the higher-order law requires construing the lowerorder law.

The Chevron doctrine, however, is silent on how a court should interpret
a regulation. The familiar guidance the Chevron doctrine gives on how a
court should determine what counts as a permissible reading of the statuteconsulting the "traditional tools of statutory construction"" 3 -has no analog
with regard to how a court should interpret a regulation. Moreover, in the
sophisticated literature on how a court should approach statutory interpretation under Chevron,5 4 the question of how a regulation is interpreted has
gone virtually unnoticed.
The dearth of doctrine addressing regulatory interpretation under Chevron can be partially explained by the well-established doctrine, attributed to
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. 55 and Auer v. Robbins,56 that an agen-

cy's construction of its own regulation is "controlling unless 'plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' 57 Agencies frequently offer
raise a serious question about its constitutionality. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 130 S.
Ct. 2896, 2929-30 & n.40 (2010). The canon is an explicit acknowledgement of a back-andforth mediation between statutory interpretation and the constitutional norms. See Ernest A.
Young, The Continuity of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: An Essay for Phil
Frickey, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1387 (2010) (arguing that constitutional avoidance "counsel[s] courts to interpret statutes in light of constitutional values" and therefore helps to
"integrate [them] into the broader constitutional structure). By contrast, the Chevron doctrine
includes no express doctrine of statutory avoidance directing courts to interpret ambiguous
regulations to avoid a construction that would invalidate them. This gap is all the more notable
because both judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation and Chevron review can be
viewed as reflecting a presumption of the validity of the lower-level law, whether legislation
or administrative action. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers and
the PreferredScope of Judicial Review, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 296, 299 (1993) (noting a parallel
between Thayer's presumption of constitutionality and Chevron's approach to judicial review
under the Constitution and a statute respectively).
53. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9; see also Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007) ("[T]he words of a statute must be read in their context
and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep't
of the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
54. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 559-66
(2009) (arguing that functional factors regarding statutory subject matter should trigger interpretive deference, rather than an exclusive focus on statutory text); Michael Herz, Deference
Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 187, 207 (1992) (arguing that step two is triggered only when Congress meant to express
nothing, not when Congress meant to express something but did so ambiguously); Stephenson
& Vermeule, supra note 51, at 600-01 (arguing that the inquiry into the permissibility of the
agency's statutory constructions are the same at step one and step two); Peter L. Strauss,
"Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and "Skidmore Weight",
112 COLUM. L. REv. 1143 (proposing that Chevron's first step of assessing whether the agency
acts within its delegated area of discretion, or its "Chevron space," is determined by a judge
according the agency's statutory construction "Skidmore weight").
55.
56.
57.

325 U.S. 410(1945).
519 U.S. 452 (1997).
Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
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interpretations of their regulations, so the question of regulatory interpretation under Chevron often turns on whether the agency's interpretation is
permissible under Seminole Rock,5" a doctrine I address in the next Section.
But many evaluations of regulations under Chevron do not depend on
the application of Seminole Rock, whether because an agency interpretation
is not available or for some other reason. 59 In those cases, the reviewing
court must still adopt an interpretation of the regulation to assess the regulation's permissibility under the authorizing statute. The moment of regulatory
interpretation can pass so swiftly as to be barely discernible. Even when the
interpretation of a regulation receives explicit attention, an uncanny detachment characterizes the interpretive exercise: courts rely on principles of
statutory interpretation without pausing or commenting on the justification for
applying those principles to regulations and without situating their approach
in relation to other decisions in which courts have construed regulations.
The Supreme Court's 2007 decision in National Association of Home

Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife60 provides a good illustration, both because
the Court devoted admirable attention to regulatory interpretation and because it did so in complete isolation from any precedent on regulatory
interpretation, as if the problem were sui generis. In Home Builders, the
Court had to resolve whether provisions of the Endangered Species Act
("ESA") required the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to consult
with the Secretary of Commerce or Interior when the EPA transferred permitting authority over discharges into navigable waters under the Clean Water
Act ("CWA") to state authorities. 6 Concluding that the ESA was ambiguous

on the point, the Court invoked Chevron to guide its review of an agency
regulation issued under the ESA stating that the ESA's consultation
58. See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261,
277-78 (2009) ("[Under Chevron] [w]e look first to the agency regulations, which are entitled

to deference if they resolve the ambiguity in a reasonable manner. But [because] the regulations, too, are ambiguous ... we next turn to the agencies' subsequent interpretation of those
regulations [under Auer]" (citations omitted)); Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v.
Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 387-91 (2003) (resolving Chevron challenge by
accepting agency's interpretation of its own regulations under Auer). For an argument taking the
further step that Seminole Rock deference is necessary to Chevron's allocation of interpretive
authority to agencies, see Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole
Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 49, 131-38

(2000).
59. William Eskridge and Lauren Baer's comprehensive study of deference to agencies'
statutory interpretations suggests that the Supreme Court frequently fails to invoke Seminole
Rock deference even when an agency's construction of its own regulation is at issue. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEo. L.J. 1083,
1103-04 (2008) (documenting that Seminole Rock is "episodically invoked," and indeed only
in 7.1 percent of eligible cases). Eskridge and Baer's preferred explanation is consistent with
the one in the text above, namely that the court uses other deference options, including Chevron deference. See id. at 1104 (noting that Chevron deference is involved in 20 percent of
eligible Seminole Rock cases).
60. 551 U.S. 644 (2007).
61.

Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 650-52.
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requirements applied to "all actions in which there is discretionary Federal
involvement or control. '62 The Court then faced two competing constructions of this regulation. Under one construction, the regulation restricted the
scope of the ESA's consultation requirements to instances of discretionary,
as opposed to mandatory, federal involvement. Under the other, the regulation merely clarified that discretionary actions were included within the
scope of the ESA's consultation provisions.63
The Court adopted the latter interpretation based on the regulation's text,
its procedural history, and the canon against surplusage. As to the regulation's text, the Court cited a classic administrative law decision, Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,6 4 and the Random House Dictionaryto sup-

port its interpretation of the word "discretionary." 65 The alternative
construction, the Court reasoned, would have rendered the regulation's reference to "discretionary" federal involvement "mere surplusage. ' 66 The
Court cited one of its own decisions applying the presumption against treating statutory terms as surplusage. 67 The regulation's procedural history, the
Court elaborated, also supported this construction: whereas the agency's
proposed version of the regulations had applied the ESA's obligations to "all
actions in which there is [flederal involvement or control," the final regula-

tions changed that language to "all actions in which there is discretionary
[f]ederal involvement or control. ' 68 All told, the alternative construction of
the regulation "would rob the word 'discretionary' of any effect, and substiversion of the regulation for the text that was
tute the earlier, proposed
69
actually adopted.
At one level, the Court's approach to regulatory interpretation in Home
Builders has a lot to recommend it. The Court self-consciously confronted
two alternative constructions of the regulation raised in its Chevron inquiry,
and deployed a variety of conventional tools of interpretation. At another
level, however, the Court's analysis reflected no sense of obligation to consider how it had previously handled similar issues of regulatory
interpretation. In an age in which federal agencies issue more binding rules
of conduct than Congress7' and a significant portion of the Court's own
docket involves regulatory issues, 71 the Court did not cite a single prior deci62.

Id. at 665 (quoting 50 C.ER. § 402.03 (2006)).

63.
64.
65.

Id. at 668-669.
401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971).
Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 668.

66.

Id. at 668-69.

67.
68.

Id. at 669 (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)).
Id. (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 29,999 (1983) and 51 Fed. Reg. 19,958 (1986) respective-

ly).
69. Id.
70. See supra note 3.
71.
See The Supreme Court, 2009 Term-The Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REV. 411, 422
tbl.IIl (2010) (noting that in the 2009 term, six of forty-nine civil cases from lower federal
courts in which the Supreme Court issued a full opinion on certiorari involved review of adminis-
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sion on regulatory interpretation as authority for its application of the particular interpretive tools it selected.
Home Builders is not an outlier; in the Supreme Court's crowded Chevron docket, it is difficult to find occasions in which the Court situates its
interpretation of a regulation under Chevron with regard to any prior instances of regulatory interpretation. 7 2 For regulatory interpretation under
Chevron, each day is a new day. But consistent application of Chevron to

regulations requires more; it requires an account of how the reviewing court
should interpret regulations for the purpose of judging their validity.
B. Seminole Rock's Inadequacy

The most obvious place to turn for assistance with regulatory interpretation is the long-standing doctrine that an agency's construction of its own
regulation is "controlling unless 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.' ,,73
This doctrine-referred to as Seminole Rock deference and

Auer deference-does not obviate the need for regulatory interpretation any
more than Chevron obviates the need for statutory interpretation.
A comparison to Chevron helps illustrate this point. Chevron obviously
requires the reviewing court to construe the statute under which the agency's
action is challenged to determine whether the agency's construction of the
statute is permissible. An analogous point applies under Seminole Rock: the

court must construe the regulation
to determine whether the agency's inter74
pretation of it is permissible.
trative actions as principal nonconstitutional issues); The Supreme Court, 2008 Term-The Statistics, 123 HARV. L. REv. 382, 393 tbl.I(2009) (in the 2008 term, eight of forty-two); The
Supreme Court, 2007 Term-The Statistics, 122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 527 tbl.LlI (2008) (in the
2007 term, three of thirty-eight).
72. See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261,
278-91 (2009) (upholding an agency's interpretation of its own regulations as reasonable
under Chevron and Auer without providing a justification for its method or citing to precedent); Long Is. Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 165-72 (2007) (upholding an
agency's interpretation of regulation under Chevron and Auer without reliance on any decision
construing a regulation to support its analysis).
73. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945))).
74. The same confusion as to whether Chevron has two interpretive steps, supra note
51, has come to roost in the Seminole Rock/Auer doctrine. Neither Seminole Rock nor Auer
includes ambiguity as a preliminary doctrinal inquiry. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461; Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). In Christensen v. Harris County, 529
U.S. 576 (2000), however, the Court articulated the Auer inquiry in terms of ambiguity: "Auer
deference is warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous." Id. at 588; see
also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006) (invoking same principle). In Chase Bank
USA, N.A. v. McCoy, the Court rationalized these strains:
[Olur statement in Christensen that "deference is warranted only when the language of
the regulation is ambiguous," is perfectly consonant with Auer itself; if the text of a regulation is unambiguous, a conflicting agency interpretation advanced in an amicus brief
will necessarily be "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation" in question.
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The Seminole Rock and Auer line of authority provides some guidance on
how a court is to judge whether an agency's interpretation of a regulation is
permissible, but judicial practice has not been consistent. In Seminole Rock,
the Court advised that its "tools ...are the plain words of the regulation and

any relevant interpretations of the Administrator."75 A strain of precedent relies primarily on the plain meaning of the regulation. In Auer, for instance, the
Court upheld the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of his own regulations
based primarily on dictionary definitions of the critical regulatory phrase
("subject to"). 76 Likewise, in Christensen v. HarrisCounty, on the basis of the
text alone, the Court rejected an agency's construction of a regulation.77 The
Court, however, has not offered a justification for this particular emphasis on
plain meaning, and courts invoke a much wider range of interpretive tools in
determining whether an agency's construction is permissible. The Supreme
Court has relied on "the Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation's
promulgation,"" canons of statutory construction,7 9 statutory language and

purpose,80 the consistency of the agency's interpretation over time, 8' the regu-

131 S. Ct. 871, 882 (2011) (citations omitted).
75. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added).
76. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (citing definitions from two dictionaries to support conclusion that the phrase "comfortably bears the meaning the Secretary assigns"); see also, e.g.,
Sec'y of Labor v.W. Fuels-Utah, Inc., 900 F2d 318, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (looking to ordinary
usage and the Merriam-WebsterDictionarydefinition to determine the meaning of "supervisory").
77. 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000) ('The regulation in this case, however, is not
ambiguous-it is plainly permissive. To defer to the agency's position would be to permit the
agency ...to create de facto a new regulation."); ee also Chase Bank, 131 S.Ct. at 878-80

(finding the regulation ambiguous based on text alone); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
512 U.S. 504, 514 (1994) ("The regulation provides, in unambiguous terms, that the 'costs' of
these educational activities will not be reimbursed when they are the result of a 'redistribution,' or shift, of costs from an 'educational' facility to a 'patient care' facility... "').
78. Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988); see also Thomas Jefferson Univ.,
512 U.S. at 512.
79. E.g., Long Is. Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170 (2007) (invoking
presumption that "the specific governs the general" and citing statutory authorities in which
specific statutory preemption provisions tmmped general savings provisions, and specific
statutory sentencing provisions trumped general ones).
80. See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 401-02 (2008) (rejecting
an interpretation of a regulation because it would be in tension with structure and purposes of
authorizing statute); Coke, 551 U.S. at 169-70 (invoking congressional intent as a basis for
resolving conflict between literal readings of two regulations); Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l
Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (refusing to defer to Secretary's
interpretation because it would force the Court "to conclude that [the Secretary] has not fulfilled her statutory duty"); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 217073 (rejecting agency's interpretation on grounds that it defied statutory language and purposes
of statutory provisions).
81. See, e.g., Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 699 (1991) (deferring to
the Secretary's interpretation, as the same "position has been faithfully advanced by each
Secretary since the regulations were promulgated"); Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 159 (1987) (granting deference and noting that the agenagency's interpretation "has been, with one exception, consistently maintained through Board
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lation's own procedural history,8 2 and the consistency with the agency's
statement of basis and purpose.8 3
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan

Bell Telephone Co.84 illustrates some of this methodological variety. In contrast to the emphasis on the plain meaning of a regulation's text, the Court in
Talk America resolved decisive issues of regulatory interpretation with reference to the explanatory preambles to Federal Communication Commission
("FCC") regulations. 85 In Talk America, the Court deferred under Seminole
RockAuer to the FCC's view, set forth in its amicus brief that, under the
FCC's regulations, incumbent communications carriers had a duty to provide
access to certain facilities ("entrance facilities") for purposes of interconnection at cost-based rates86 even though incumbent carriers do not have a duty to
provide "unbundled" access to those same entrance facilities at cost-based
rates.87
AT&T argued that the FCC's interpretation was inconsistent with its regu88
lations and therefore not entitled to deference under Seminole Rock/Auer.
Rejecting AT&T's position,8 9 the Court relied extensively on the FCC's expla-

nations in its regulatory preambles as to the scope of the FCC's prior
decisions"); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965) (deferring to the agency and noting that
"[s]ince their promulgation, the Secretary has consistently construed both orders not to bar oil
and gas leases").
82. See, e.g., Gardebring,485 U.S. at 430 n.14 (drawing inference that term "recipient"
includes first-time "applicants" for benefits despite the change in language from "applicant or
recipient" in proposed regulation to "applicant" in final regulation on ground that omission of
"recipient" was "inadvertently omitted" (emphasis omitted)).
83. See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261,
287-91 (2009) (invoking agency's statement of basis and purpose to reject claimed inconsistency between agency's actions with its regulations); infra text accompanying notes 84-96
(discussing Talk America).
84.
131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011).
85. Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2262 (2011). The FCC frequently issues its final rules
and their regulatory preambles under the caption of "order" or "report and order." These orders include the FCC's statement of basis and purpose, the final text of the regulations as well
as the other elements required for notice-and-comment rulemaking. See, e.g., In re Unbundled
Access to Network Elements, 20 FCC Rcd. 2533 (2005) [hereinafter Triennial Review Remand Order] (includes statement of basis and purpose, text of regulation, and other
requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking); see also Rulemaking, FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/rulemaking (last visited Jan. 2, 2012)
(noting that the FCC issues and amends rules under the caption "Report and Order").
Talk Am., 131 S.Ct. at 2261 (referring to47 C.F.R. § 51.321(a) (2010)).
Id. at 2258, 2262 (referring to 47 C.F.R. § 51.319(e)(2)(i) (2005)).
88. Brief for Respondent at 36-38, Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. 2254 (Nos. 10-313 & 10-329)
(arguing Auer deference is not warranted because including entrance facilities as a method of
obtaining interconnection is inconsistent with the regulations and would amount to amendment
of them). AT&T had argued that the FCC's regulations that eliminated incumbents' obligations to
provide unbundled access to entrance facilities at cost-based rates also eliminated incumbents'
obligations to provide access to those same facilities for purposes of interconnection at those
rates. Id. at 41-48.
86.
87.

89.

See Talk Am., 131 S.Ct. at 2262.
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regulations. 90 The Court noted that the FCC had "emphasized" in the explana-

tory preambles of two prior regulations that its unbundling decision "'d[id]
not alter' the obligation on incumbent [carriers] ... to provide facilities for
interconnection purposes." 91 Moreover, the Court found that the distinction
made in these FCC explanatory materials-between access to entrance

facilities for interconnection purposes and unbundled access to those facilities-though unstated in the text of the regulation, "[was] neither unusual
nor ambiguous*"92 For the Court in Talk America, judging the consistency

of the FCC's interpretation of its regulations depended on the consistency
of its position with the agency's prior explanations in its statements of basis
and purpose. 93 While the Court engaged in textual analysis of the regula-

tions,94 it unmistakably relied on the FCC's regulatory preambles to determine
whether the agency was entitled to deference under Seminole RocklAuer.95
Talk America's reliance on regulatory preambles for the purpose of
construing FCC regulations is not itself a problem; on the contrary, one of
the central practical aims of this Article is to defend that approach to regulatory interpretation. But Talk America illustrates the lack of attention
paid to interpretive method under Seminole Rock. The Court in Talk

America did not pause to justify its reliance on the FCC's regulatory preambles, or distinguish the case from prior decisions resolving Seminole
Rock determinations on the basis of the regulatory text alone. In the increasing stream of Seminole Rock decisions, one strains to discern any
greater attention to regulatory interpretation than is apparent under the
Chevron doctrine.
90.

96

Id. at 2261-63.

91. Id. at 2264 (quoting Triennial Review Remand Order, 20 FCC Rcd. 2533, 2611
(2005) and Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exch.
Carriers, 18 FCC Rcd. 16,978, 17,204 (2003) [hereinafter Triennial Review Order]). The Triennial Review Remand Order states, "We note in addition that our finding of non-impairment
with respect to entrance facilities does not alter the right of competitive LECs to obtain interconnection facilities pursuant to section 251(c)(2) .... " 20 FCC Rcd. at 2611. The Triennial
Review Order states that "to the extent that requesting carriers need facilities in order to 'interconnect[] with the [incumbent LEC's] network,' section 251(c)(2) ... expressly provides
for this and we do not alter the Commission's interpretation of this obligation." 18 FCC Rcd.
at 17,204 (alteration in original).
92. Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2264-65.
93. Id. at 2265 ("We see no conflict between the Triennial Review orders and the
Commission's views expressed here.").
94. See id. at 2262-63 (rejecting AT&T's argument that exclusion of transport facilities
from definition of interconnection, see 47 C.F.R. § 51.5 (2011), excludes obligations to provide access to entrance facilities based on inference from regulatory and statutory text).
95. The Court noted, for instance, that the FCC had explained that incumbent local
exchange carriers "would be required to 'adapt their facilities to interconnection' and to 'accept the novel use of, and modification to, [their] network facilities.'" Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at
2261-62 (alternation in original) (quoting In re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, 15,605 (1996)).
96. See supra notes 78-83 (citing decisions interpreting regulations with little or no
reference to other decisions doing the same). One notable exception is agency preemption,
where the Court has devoted energy to citing and distinguishing its own treatment of an issue.
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C. Accardi's Complexity
The story is much the same under the established doctrine of United
States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,97 frequently called the Accardi
principle.98 The Accardi principle requires an agency to follow its own
regulations.99 Application of the Accardi principle obviously requires the
court to interpret the agency regulations at issue. As Thomas Merrill notes,
based on his extensive survey of Accardi decisions in the D.C. Circuit, one
of the recurring issues in Accardi litigation is "the need to determine the
meaning of an agency regulation."'"°
Merrill's study showed that Accardi decisions offer no particular insight or consistent approach to regulatory interpretation. Like decisions
under Chevron and Seminole Rock, Merrill describes the D.C. Circuit's
Accardi decisions as "all over the lot" on the recurring issue of how to
interpret a regulation:1"'
Sometimes the court defers to the agency's interpretation of the regula-

tion under the Seminole Rock doctrine; sometimes the court insists that
the meaning of the regulation is plain and the agency will not be heard to

argue to the contrary; sometimes the court stretches a regulation to give
effect to its perceived purposes ...

"oe

Indeed, Accardi decisions, whether revolving around a Seminole Rock
inquiry or not, invoke a familiar variety of interpretive tools. Some
rely only on plain meaning, °3 while others also look to statutory
See, e.g., Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 131, 1139-40 (2011) (distinguishing treatment of preemption in Geier v.Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)).
97. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
98. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 859, 873 & n.44
(2009) (noting that the principle is also associated with Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388
(1957), and Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 389
(1932)); Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 569, 569 & n.1
(2006) (noting that the principle is also widely attributed to Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535
(1959)).
99. See Accardi, 347 U.S. at 266-67.
100. Merrill, supra note 98, at 589-90 (noting conclusion based on study of Accardi
litigation in the D.C. Circuit between 1954 and 2005).
101. Id. at 590.
102. Id. (footnotes omitted).
103. See, e.g., Singh v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 461 F.3d 290, 296-97 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting BIA panel interpretation of INS regulations because regulation "plainly states" that
waiver of application may take into account "factors that arose subsequent to the alien's entry"
such as marriage to a U.S. citizen (internal quotation marks omitted)); Exportal Ltd. v. United
States, 902 F2d 45, 50-51 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (arguing that the APA compels a plain meaning
approach to regulatory interpretation and concluding that because the agency "has expressed
itself in language that has a plain meaning, we look no further than the text of its rule"); Union
of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 711 F.2d 370, 381 (D.C. Cit. 1983)
(rejecting agency's interpretation of term "manner" in its own rule because interpretation
"does violence to the language of the rule").
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purpose,' °4 regulatory purpose,' °5 canons of construction,10 6 and regulatory
history. 071 These decisions have the same ad hoc quality apparent under
Chevron and Seminole Rock; there is generally little to no self-conscious

effort to build on prior decisions that interpreted regulations or to specify
how tools of construction relate to one another, much less to justify what
makes one tool or another appropriate. 18 Like Chevron and Seminole Rock,

Accardi too requires a theory of regulatory interpretation.
D. The APA's Neglected InterpretiveMandate

The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), moreover, clearly requires
courts reviewing agency action to interpret the agency's action, including its
rules and regulations. Section 706 directs that the reviewing court "shall ...
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action."' 9
The same section of the APA on the scope of review-section 706authorizes "arbitrary" or "capricious" review" 0 and provides the statutory
foothold for the Chevron doctrine."' But judicial and scholarly attention to
104. See, e.g., Holden v. Finch, 446 F.2d 1311, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("[The agency's]
reading is at odds with the Congressional purpose, stated in the Hatch Act itself, that the statutory proscription of partisan political activity does not extend to the right of an employee 'to
express his opinion on political subjects'.... ).
105. See, e.g., Leslie v. Att'y Gen., 611 F.3d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[The regulation]
was manifestly designed to protect an alien's fundamental statutory and constitutional right to
counsel at a removal hearing."); Rotinsulu v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir. 2008) (affirming agency's interpretation of its regulation based on regulatory intent); Montilla v. INS, 926
F.2d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 1991) ("By forcing the alien to state his preference... the regulation is
clearly designed to force that person to confront this choice."); Teleprompter Cable Commc'ns
Corp. v. FCC, 565 F.2d 736, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (relying on regulatory purpose in rejecting
agency's interpretation of regulation).
106. See, e.g., Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1993) ("We think the INS views
[the regulation] too narrowly. [The regulation], in conjunction with [a separate regulation],
permits the BIA to reach a meritorious question ....
); Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d
315, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("[Wle generally apply a new regulation retrospectively on appeal
as long as such application does not result in a manifest injustice ....
).
107. See, e.g., Ohio Power Co. v. FERC, 954 F.2d 779, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding
evolution of regulation during rulemaking process weighed against agency's interpretation of
"deemed").
108. See, e.g., Chong v. Dist. Dir., INS, 264 F.3d 378, 389 (3d Cir. 2001) (relying on text
of regulation without further explanation); Waldron, 17 F.3d at 517 (same); Montilla, 926 F.2d
at 166 (same); Chevron Oil Co. v. Andrus, 588 F.2d 1383, 1387-88 (5th Cir. 1979) (same);
Teleprompter, 565 F.2d at 740-41 (same). But see Exportal, 902 F2d at 50 (rejecting parallel
between reading interpretation of statutes and regulations).
109. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006); see also id. § 551(13) (defining "agency action" to include
"the whole or part of an agency rule").
110. Id. § 706(2)(A).
111. Id. § 706 ("[T]he reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law [including interpreting] constitutional and statutory provisions."); see also John F. Duffy,
Administrative Common Law in JudicialReview, 77 Tx. L. REv. 113, 193-202 (1998) (explaining the difficulty with reconciling Chevron with these provisions of APA § 706 and
arguing that viewing Chevron as an interpretation of general agency rulemaking grants recon-
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the task of interpreting agency action, including agency regulations, pales in
comparison to that devoted to the Chevron doctrine and arbitrariness review.
It is time for interpreting the meaning of agency action, including regulations, to take its place alongside the other requirements of section 706 in
judicial focus and theory.
II. THE DISTINCTIVE LEGAL CHARACTER OF REGULATIONS

To develop a theory of regulatory interpretation, it makes sense to begin
by identifying distinctive characteristics of regulations. This Part argues that
the distinctive legal characteristics of regulations and their place in public
law hold implications for the privileged sources of interpretation as well as
for the goals of regulatory interpretation-two key elements in a theory of
legal interpretation. As to the sources of interpretation, the way in which
administrative law binds the text of regulations to their statements of basis
and purpose suggests that it does not make sense to interpret the regulation's
text independently from its accompanying statement. As to the goal of interpretation, the role of agencies as implementers of established statutory aims
suggests that regulations have a purposive character-that is, they prescribe
means to implement the ends provided by the statute. Therefore, a primary,
perhaps the primary, goal for interpretation should be interpreting the regulations in light of their purposes. From these two premises, the later Parts of
this Article develop and defend a purposive theory of interpretation.
A. The Twofold Characterof Regulations

Regulations-specifically, regulations produced through notice-andcomment rulemaking-are creatures of administrative law. The interaction
of three well-established features of American administrative law-the APA,
hard-look review, and the Chenery principle-gives regulations their distinctive legal character, and suggests that the regulation's text should be read
in company with the regulation's statement of basis and purpose.
1. The Statement of Basis and Purpose. One of the definitive requirements

of notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA is that the agency incorporate into the regulations it issues "a concise general statement of their basis
and purpose."" 2 In general, the failure to issue an adequate statement of basis
and purpose renders the agency's action invalid." 3 The requirement to
ciles it with § 706); Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1298-1303 (arguing that Chevron and State Farm are exemplars of administrative common law, characterized by gradual, precedent-based evolution of the doctrine

with tenuous connection to statute).
112. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
113. Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(vacating agency rule for failure to provide adequate statement of basis and purpose); Indep.
U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (concluding that
agency's one-sentence justification for rule was inadequate and ordering that the rule be vacated for failure to provide statement of basis and purpose); see also 1 RIdCHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
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produce a statement of basis and purpose is such a basic aspect of noticeand-comment rulemaking that it hardly seems remarkable. But despite its
quotidian status within administrative law, it does mark an important point
of contrast between regulations and statutes. Congress need not provide an
authoritative statement of its purposes and grounds to enact legislation
under Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution.
2. The Standardof Rationality.While the APA's mandate that the agency

promulgating rules produce a "concise general statement of their basis and
purpose" might have been understood to require only a reference to the statutory authority for the regulation and its ends,' 1 4 the judiciary has long
treated it as requiring a detailed statement of the agency's reasoning supporting the choices that the agency made. Judicial review of whether an
agency has produced an adequate statement of basis and purpose has been
intertwined with review of whether the regulation is "arbitrary" or "capricious."11 5 As is familiar to students of administrative law, beginning in the
1960s and 1970s, the judiciary elaborated the "arbitrary" or "capricious"
standard of review under the APA into a demanding form of rationality re16
view known as the hard-look doctrine.
Under the leading formulation of this doctrine, "the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choices
made.' """ The court "consider[s] whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment."' 18 In addition, the agency may not "entirely fail[] to consider an
important aspect of the problem," may not "offer[] an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency," nor offer an
explanation that is "so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise."' 119 The agency must also
relate the factual findings and expected effects of the regulation to the purposes or goals the agency must consider under the statute 120 as well as
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

§ 7.1, at 557 (5th ed. 2010) (noting that issuing statement of

basis and purpose is part of the three-step procedure required by section 553 of the APA).
114. 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE, supra note 113, § 7.4, at 592.
115. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
116. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 421, 463-74 (1987) (characterizing hard-look doctrine as beginning in late 1960s and
early 1970s and as requiring agencies to take a close look at regulatory choices).
117. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (citation omitted).
118. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id.
120. See Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 851-52 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (reversing agency rule as arbitrary and capricious for failure to explain why alternatives
were rejected in tight of purposes of statute).
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respond to salient criticisms of the agency's reasoning.' 2 ' Hard-look review
further distinguishes regulations from legislation; it has long been underthan the minimum rational
stood as requiring a higher standard of 1rationality
22
basis standard of constitutional review.
3. The Timing Rule. Operating alongside this demanding standard for
agency rationality, and frequently considered an aspect of arbitrary and capricious review, is the requirement that the agency's statement of reasons
justifying its action appear at the time the agency acts, not afterwards. The
Supreme Court's 1943 decision in SEC v. Chenery Corp. provides the classic formulation of this principle: "[A]n administrative order cannot be
upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its
powers were those upon which its action can be sustained."' 23 The Chenery
principle has been taken as settled since it was announced and applies to
24
rulemaking as well as other forms of agency action.

This high demand that the agency's action be sustained only on the

grounds upon which the agency based its decision is also unique in American public law. Neither constitutional review of federal legislation nor the
standards of appellate review of lower court decisions impose this demand-

ing uphold-only-for-the-reasons-given rule. 125 The combination of the
searching standard of review defined by the hard-look doctrine and the
Chenery principle has resulted, as Martin Shapiro observes, in courts holding that "a rule [is] not arbitrary and capricious only when it [is] well

reasoned and well supported by facts" set forth by the agency at the time it
acts. 126
121. See City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F3d 706, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("The requirement
that agency action not be arbitrary or capricious includes a requirement that the agency respond to relevant and significant public comments." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
122. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 n.9 ("We do not view as equivalent the presumption
of constitutionality afforded legislation drafted by Congress and the presumption of regularity
afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory mandate."); Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson,
Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 856, 870 (2007) (noting that by 1978
courts were routinely engaging in more searching review of agency action under hard-look
doctrine than required by due process); Michael Herz, The Rehnquist Court and
Administrative Law, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 297, 310 n.50 (2004) (noting that hard-look review
states a higher standard of rationality than due process review of legislation, and that all nine
justices in State Farm so held).
123.
which an
its action
124.

318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943); see also Chenery, 318 U.S. at 87 ("[Tlhe grounds upon
administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that
was based:').
See Stack, supra note 24, at 962-66 (describing grounds of Chenery's application).

125. Id. at 967-71 (noting that rule of review analogous to the Chenery rule does not
apply in constitutional review or in appellate review of lower court decisions).
126. Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 185
(1992); see also MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATION 48-50 (1988) (describing the conjunction of the hard-look standard and
Chenery's reasoning-giving requirement). The uniqueness of this demand for reason-giving,
alongside the Court's characterization of it as a deferential aspect of review, raises a question as
to the doctrine's foundation. I offer an account of Chenery that explains its difference from rules
of review in constitutional law and its scope of application. See Stack, supra note 24, at
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4. Implications. These three requirements-the APA's procedural requirement that the agency issue a statement of basis and purpose, the
arbitrary and capricious review's standard of rationality, and Chenery's timing rule-not only impose a uniquely high demand for rationality on agency
action but also distinctively bind the agency's rules to the reasoning the
agency provides for them in its statement of basis and purpose. Issuing a
statement of basis and purpose is not merely a procedural requirement of
validity in the way that a majority (or supermajority) vote in the Senate is
necessary to enact legislation. Instead, the statement of basis and purpose is
one part of the agency's product in the rulemaking proceeding. Moreover,
because a reviewing court can uphold the agency's rule solely on the basis
of the grounds offered in the statement of basis and purpose, the substantive
validity of the rule depends on the content of the agency's statement of basis
and purpose.
As a result, the statement of basis and purpose is not only joined to the
text of the rule as the other principal product of the rulemaking proceeding,
but it also provides the grounds for the validity of the rule. The two-the
rule issued and the statement of basis and purpose-form an intertwined
couplet; the text without the statement is invalid, and the text is valid only so
far as it is justified by the statement. From this perspective, the text of the
regulation alone does not constitute the regulatory act. Rather, the regulatory
text is one part of the twofold act that also includes the statement of basis
and purpose.
Based on the premise that the text of a regulation is one part of a twofold
regulatory act, it does not make sense to interpret the text of the regulation
independently from its statement of basis and purpose. Once the rules and
statements are seen as part of the same regulatory act, the text of the regulation should be read in light of the statement of basis and purpose. Put in
terms of the sources of review, recognizing this twofold character of regulation clarifies that the regulatory text and statement of basis and purpose
should constitute privileged sources for regulatory interpretation. This use
fits the Attorney General's expectations at the time of the APA's enactment.
As the Attorney General's Manual on the APA states, the required statement
of basis and purpose "will be important in that the courts and the public may
992-1004 (arguing that Chenery enforces values attributed to the nondelegation doctrine and
arguing that this account explains Chenery's scope of application to agency actions that bind with
the force of law). The Chenery rule has been long understood to constrain the role of government
litigation counsel to posit grounds for the agency's action. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) ("[W]e have declined to give deference to an agency counsel's interpretation of a statute where the agency itself has articulated no position on the
question... "); State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50 ("[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel's post
hoc rationalizations for agency action."). Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule argue that
consequence best explains the doctrine. See Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating
Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1044 (2011) ("Chenery is thus best understood
...as a doctrine that constrains the role of lawyers in formulating agency policies.").

December 2012]

Interpreting Regulations

be expected to use such statements in the interpretation of the agency's
rules.

127

(As addressed later, it has many other virtues.)

Specifying the regulation's text and the statement of basis and purpose
as privileged sources for interpretation is an important step in developing an
interpretive approach, but it does not suggest the goals of interpretation. To
gain some purchase on the aims of regulatory interpretation, it is worth
stepping back to consider the place of regulations in public law.
B. The InstitutionalPlace of Regulations

Agencies are implementing bodies. Statutes establish agencies' goals
and the scope of their powers. The minimum requirement for a constitutionally permissible delegation can be understood as the statute establishing an
aim, a goal for the agency, or in the phrasing of the doctrine, an "intelligible
principle"'128 to guide the agency's action. Those goals or principles may be
set forth at a high level of generality-for instance, setting air standards that
"allow[] an adequate margin of safety, [and] are requisite to protect the public health,' 1 29 or regulating radio broadcasting "as public convenience,
interest, or necessity requires."' 3 ° But the statute still establishes the agency's ends-and frequently also permissible means for pursuing those ends.
The agency's task then is to implement-to give effect to-those basic
goals, consistent with any specification of means in the statute. As Edward
Rubin writes, "We create agencies and authorize them to act.., because we
want them to implement our basic commitments-our value choices."''
Not only is the agency's role one of implementation, but the validity of
its actions also depends on the agency demonstrating an instrumentally rational connection between its chosen means and the ends prescribed by the
statute. As noted in the preceding Section, arbitrary and capricious review
requires the agency to demonstrate how its actions-including its regulations-further the agency's statutory goals or purposes. 132 This leads to an
important characterization: regulations have a purposive character in the
sense that they are part of the agency's effort to implement statutory goals or
principles, and they are valid only insofar as they are consistent with those
goals or principles. That understanding, in turn, suggests a basic orientation
127. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 32 (1947); see also Manning, supra note 7, at 689 (noting the same).
128. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457,474 (2001).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006); see also Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-76 (upholding
this delegation to the EPA).
130. 47 U.S.C. § 303; see also Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217-18
(1943) (upholding this delegation to the FCC).
131. Edward Rubin, It's ime to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 149 (2003).
132. See 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 113, § 7.4. This requirement has
deep roots in thought about administrative governance. As Ed Rubin writes, "According to
[Max] Weber, instrumental rationality is the dominant principle of modem bureaucratic government." Rubin, supra note 131, at 148.
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to their interpretation: if regulations have a purposive character in the sense
of functioning to implement the statute, then one aim of interpretation
should be to understand the agency's chosen means in light of the purposes
or principles it sought to implement.
Putting these implications-for both sources and goals-together reveals
the seeds for a method of interpretation. Based on the premise that regulations
have a purposive character, the interpreter will approach the regulation trying
to make sense of it as having a purpose or purposes. But because of the twofold nature of the regulatory act, the privileged sources for ascertaining that
purpose will be the text of the regulation itself and the agency's statement of
basis and purpose. Accordingly, the thrust of regulatory interpretation is
purposive, and discerning the regulation's purposes will turn toward the
agency's own understanding of those purposes as reflected in the text, and
just as importantly, in the regulation's statement of basis and purpose.

This brief examination of the legal character and role of regulations has
suggested elements of a purposive method of interpretation. As a method of
interpretation, purposivism has a long pedigree.133 The shape and limits of a
purposive theory have been particularly well developed with regard to statutory interpretation. Indeed, in the last decade, arguments about the merits of
purposivism and textualism have dominated debates on statutory interpretation,13 during which time textualist tenets have had an important impact on
judges and scholars. 135 To develop a purposive theory of regulatory interpretation, it makes sense to assess whether a purposive approach could find
grounding in premises of purposive theory more generally, while at the
same time avoiding the central critiques to which purposive approaches to
statutory interpretation have been subject.
133. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandingsof the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 990, 1003-05,
1018-21 (2001) (documenting early practices of statutory interpretation in which the courts
attended to the mischief the statute sought to remedy); John F Manning, Textualism and the
Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (2001) (documenting early English practices
of interpreting a statute in light of its spirit and arguing that early understandings of American
"judicial power" contradict the view that judges were vested with the power of equitable interpretation).
134. See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Foreword: The Limits of
Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REv. 4, 15-26 (1998) (describing the principal interpretive schools articulated by Supreme Court justices and highlighting points of common
ground); John F Manning, What Divides Textualistsfrom Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 75 (2006) (describing the remaining differences between textualism and purposivism);
Molot, supra note 28, at 2-5 (2006) (characterizing the debate as between textualist and purposivists and arguing that little disagreement remains).
135. See Molot, supra note 28, at 31-33 (demonstrating textualism's impact on judges
and scholars).
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II.

LEGAL PROCESS PURPOSIVISM REVISITED

Henry Hart and Albert Sacks's The Legal Process 36 remains the com-

mon reference point for purposive interpretation in general 137 and for a
purposive theory of statutory interpretation in particular. 138 Hart and Sacks's

distinctive conception of the rationality of law made their theory an attractive synthesis of legal formalist and legal realist thought.139 But their theory
has come to be defined by one aspect of its commitment to a rational understanding of law-the counsel that judges treat legislation as40if it were

enacted by reasonable legislators pursuing reasonable purposes. 1

This Part argues that this conventional reading of Hart and Sacks ne-

glects the scope of their commitments to positive sources for discerning
purpose and fails to understand how attention to those positive sources fits
within their rationalized conception of law. Once Hart and Sacks's jurispru-

dential commitments to positive sources-both in their approach to
interpretation and its grounding-come into view, it also becomes clear how
a purposive approach to regulatory interpretation could build on their theory
by making an analogy between a statute's enacted statement of purpose and
a regulation's statement of basis and purpose.
136.

HART & SACKS, supra note 27.

137. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical
Introduction, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS, at li,
lii
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (noting the centrality of The Legal
Process materials to purpose-based views of statutory interpretation); Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 89, 93

n.16 (2009) (treating Hart and Sacks as touchstone for purposivism); Manning, supra note
134, at 86 (2006) ("[T]heir materials have come to represent the canonical statement of pur-

posivism."). The purposive views of statutory interpretation extend well beyond Hart and
Sacks. See, e.g., infra note 158.

138. Cf Young, supra note 52, at 1381-83 (noting that legal process principles developed in specific context of statutory construction).
139. See Rubin, supra note 28, at 1394-98 (describing legal process as a synthesis of
these two traditions). On the one hand, in contrast to legal formalism, legal process scholars,
like Hart and Sacks, recognized legal decisionmaking as a creative process, involving an elaboration of basic values. Id. On the other hand, in contrast to the realists, these scholars
understood law and legal decisionmaking as a rational enterprise. But they had a different
conception of rationality than the formalists. As opposed to cogitation about transcendent legal
principles, Hart and Sacks, among other legal process thinkers, viewed reason as "informed by
an organic relationship among legal rules, social policies, and ethical principles." Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 137, at lxiii; see also NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205 (1995) ("[Legal p]rocess jurisprudence ... marks the beginning of American

lawyers attempting to explain legal decision-making not in terms of deductive logic or the
intuitions of officials, but in terms of reason which is embodied in the fabric of the law itself.").
140. HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1378.
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A. The Purposive Technique

In The Legal Process, Hart and Sacks provide clear guidance to courts
on the aims and "technique"'141 of statutory interpretation. Their approach to
statutory interpretation has four basic elements: the court is to (1) "[d]ecide
what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and any subordinate provision of it," (2) "[i]nterpret the words of the statute immediately in question
so as to carry out [that] purpose as best it can," making sure (3) not to give
the words "a meaning they will not bear,"
and finally, (4) not to "violate any
142
established policy of clear statement."'
1. Discerning Purpose. How a court "attributes" purposes to a statute
and its subordinate provisions constitutes "[tlhe principal problem in the
development of a workable technique of interpretation."' 143 Hart and Sacks's
approach to attributing purposes is frequently taken to be reducible to their
counsel that the court should "assume, unless the contrary unmistakably
appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing
reasonable purposes reasonably."'" Taking that rationalist, reconstructive
attitude as the defining or exclusive way in which Hart and Sacks advise a
court to discern purpose exposes their theory to a host of objections. Perhaps
most enduring has been a cluster of objections that understand Hart and
Sacks's claim as premised on a naive conception of the legislative and political process. As Robert Post writes, "The persistence of hot and intractable
political dispute suggests that, in fact, politics is not inhabited by 'reasonable persons' who participate in a shared, intersubjective web of meanings
and values."'1 45 In a similar vein, based on public choice theory, scholars argue that many statutes are the products of deals to implement special
interests and often lack overarching or even specific purposes to serve the
public interest. 46 From this perspective, the presumption of a reasonable
legislature, when "measured against the true workings of the legislative process ... is an unreasonably optimistic view."'1 47 Further, Richard Posner
writes that "the spectrum of respectable opinion on political and social questions has widened so enormously that even if we could assume that
legislators intended to bring about reasonable results in all cases, the as4s
sumption would not generate specific legal concepts.'
141.

Id. at 1378 (referring to "technique" for attributing purpose).

142.
143.

Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1125.

144. Id. at 1378; see, e.g., supra note 30.
145. Post, supra note 28, at 1335.
146. See DuXBURY, supra note 139, at 263; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroomand in the Courtroom, 50 U. CH1. L. REv. 800, 817-22 (1983) ("But to

ignore these [interest groups] runs the risk of attributing to legislation not the purposes reasonably inferable from the legislation itself, but the judge's own conceptions of the public
interest."); Post, supra note 28, at 1335.
147. Manning, supra note 134, at 102; see also Nourse, supra note 30.
148. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretationof Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. Rsv. 179, 193 (1986).
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Reading Hart and Sacks's approach as defined by independent judicial
construction of reasonable purposes of legislation, their theory would appear
to have little to offer as a foundation for a purposive theory of regulatory
interpretation. Based on this reading, their technique for discerning purpose
not only confronts an array of practical and theoretical objections, but it also
does not make sense of the elements of the purposive approach to regulatory
interpretation identified thus far. In particular, it does not provide a reason to
accord the statement of basis and purpose a special place in discerning the
meaning of the regulation's text. It would rather have the court inquire into
the reasonable purposes of the regulation without any particular tether to the
agency's public rationalization. But this is not the best reading of Hart and
Sacks's theory.
Far from launching the court into a freewheeling reconstruction of a reasonable legislative purpose as the first and primary step of discerning
legislative purpose, Hart and Sacks describe the task of attributing purpose
to a statute or its provisions as having two sequential steps. The first step in
attributing purpose is for the court to consider any "formally enacted statement of purpose. ' 149 So long as the enacted statement was designed to shed
light on interpretation, was consistent with the text, and pertained to the
question at issue, the court should "accept[]" the formally enacted statement
of purpose. 150 This first step is critical. By "accept[ing]" Congress's own
statement of purpose, the court grants a very strong form of deference to
Congress's own articulation of the purpose of the statute.
For Hart and Sacks, it is only after the court has determined that such an
enacted statement of purpose is not available or not useful that it must "infer" purpose.15' In particular, once the court has exhausted the prospect of a
congressional statement of purpose, it should adopt Hart and Sacks's famil152
iar imaginative attitude, reconstructing a reasonable legislature's solution,
as opposed to adopting the stance of a political realist or the "cynical political observer" attending to the "short-run currents of political expedience
that swirl around any legislative session."'5 3
149. HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1377. Such an enacted statement of purpose is
part of the text of legislation, frequently enacted along with findings. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 802, 124 Stat. 1376,
1802-03 (2010) (setting forth findings and purposes for Title VIII, Payment Clearing and
Settlement Supervision Act of 2010); Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-154, § l(b)-(c) 124 Stat. 1087, 1087-88 (2010) (setting forth findings and purposes);
Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-22, § 1002, 123 Stat. 1663, 1664 (2009) (setting forth findings and purposes); Omnibus
Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, §§ 10801-10802, 123 Stat. 991,
1405-07 (2009) (setting forth findings and purposes for subtitle pertaining to Shoshone-Paiute

Tribes of Duck Valley Reservation's Water Rights Settlement).
150.

HART & SAcKs, supra note 27, at 1377.

151.
152.

Id.
The court "assume[s], unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature

[is] made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably." Id. at 1378.
153. Id. at 1378.
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But even in this broader task of inferring purpose, the text plays a critical role. As Hart and Sacks explain, when the court must infer purpose, it
should be attentive to the fact that purposes can exist at a level of "great
generality," at a level of specificity in which they resolve "specific application[s]," as well as in "hierarchies."1 54 Purposes also pertain not only to the
statute as a whole but also to "subordinate provision[s]" within it.t 55 The
task is to discern purposes, plural, for the statute and its provisions, not
solely a single overarching purpose. That provision-specific inquiry will
necessarily be strongly informed by the text and its varieties, not merely
constructing what a rationalized legislature aimed to do.
This is not to deny that this second step of inferring purpose can also re156
quire a broad synthesis. Because meaning is the product of context,
inferring purpose involves understanding the meaning of the statute in its
whole context. '5 And Hart and Sacks understand the relevant context capaciously. While the text of the statute itself is a primary basis for inferring
purpose, the context encompasses the state of the law prior to the enactment
of the statute, the public understanding of the "mischief' the statute aimed
to remedy as well as documents produced during legislative consideration of
the statute to the extent they bear on its general purpose.' 58 As the law develops so does the context of the statute's interpretation; the accumulation of
fixed judicial and administrative constructions informs the attribution of
purpose in context.' 59 Moreover, the synthetic demands are broader still because, for Hart and Sacks, "[t]he purpose of a statute must always be treated
as including not only an immediate purpose or group of related purposes but
a larger and subtler purpose as to how the particular statute is to be fitted
into the legal system as a whole,"' 6 ° including constitutional principles.' 6 '
But what this brief summary reveals is that there is greater variety in the
task of attributing purpose under Hart and Sacks's theory than is frequently
acknowledged-and particularly relevant for regulatory interpretation, that
the starting point for interpretation is consulting any enacted statement of
purpose.
2. The Dual Function of Text. While attributing purpose and formulating
constructions of the statute to further these purposes launches the interpretive inquiry, Hart and Sacks posit that a court will check its prospective
154.

Id. at 1377.

155.
156.
157.

Id. at 1378.
Id. at 1377, 1379.
Id. at 1375.

158. Id. at 1375, 1379; see also id. at 1253-54; Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and
the Interpretationof Statutes, 60 HARV. L. REv. 370, 379 (1947) (noting that legislative history materials do not cause danger when they are used solely to determine the general purpose
of the statute).
159. HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1379.
160. Id. at 1377; see also DUXBURY, supra note 139, at 261.
161. See Young, supra note 52, at 1383-86 (arguing that, for legal process thinkers, constitutional values constitute part of the background purposes to which the interpreter should
attend); see also HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1378.
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constructions against the statute's text. As Hart and Sacks put it, the text of
the statute serves a dual role. 6 2 On the one hand, as we have just seen, it
constitutes a central source for inferring purpose. But the text also operates
as a separate constraint. Recall that the court "ought never to give the words
of a statute a meaning they will not bear,"'63 and may infer a reasonable purpose for the legislation "unless the contrary unmistakably appears."' 64 The
interpreter is to test the provisional construction to ensure it does not fall
Sacks mean "whether a
beyond what the words will bear, by which Hart and
65
particular meaning is linguistically permissible.'
Hart and Sacks have specific advice as to how a court should do so. To
discern the scope of permissible construction, Hart and Sacks recommend a
cautious and particular use of dictionaries and canons of construction. Neither dictionaries nor canons of construction, they advise, "should ... be
treated ... as saying what meaning a word or group of words must have in a
given context."'1 66 The assessment of linguistic meaning operates as a negative to rule out interpretations and works "almost wholly to prevent rather
than to compel expansion of the scope of statutes."'167 This check against the
text is thus not an invitation to inquire into the best interpretation based
solely on the text. It is rather to make sure the construction does not exceed
the outer bounds of permissible meaning. This approach to text, as I suggest
below, could be incorporated into a theory of regulatory interpretation.
3. Policies of Clear Statement. Finally, prospective interpretations must
be checked against policies of "clear statement."'' 68 When a statute impinges
on crosscutting policy, the court may have to read it in a way that defeats a
particular legislative purpose to protect that policy unless the legislature
"speak[s] with more than [the] ordinary clearness" on the issue. 69 These policies concern, for instance, criminal prohibitions not thought to be morally
blameworthy, 170 departures from generally accepted policy, and constitutional
questions. 7'
Hart and Sacks's purposive interpretation thus involves reflective
testing-positing an interpretation based on the best construction of the
statute's purpose from a statute's enacted statement of purposes, or more
generally, in view of its context, while at the same time checking that
162. See HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1375 ("The Double Role of the Words as
Guides to Interpretation").
163. Id. at 1375.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 1378.
Id.
Id. at 1191.

167.
168.
169.

Id. at 1376.
Id.
Id. at 1376-77.

170. Id. at 1377.
171.
See id.; see also Young, supra note 52, at 1383-86 (suggesting role of background
constitutional values for legal process thinkers).
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prospective construction against the statute's text to ensure that it is
linguistically permissible and comports with background values.
B. The Grounds for Purposivism

To assess whether it makes sense to adapt Hart and Sacks's technique of
interpretation to regulations, it is important to understand the grounds on
which they justify this technique. The Legal Process is more articulate as to

the method of purposive statutory interpretation than as to its theoretical
justification' 72 --not surprising for materials that were assembled for a law
school classroom experience. 173 With some reconstruction, however, the
jurisprudence that underpins Hart and Sacks's purposive approach becomes
clear. What emerges is not only a jurisprudence of striking generality but
also one that explains how the privileged place they give to enacted text and
statements of purpose is consistent with their underlying commitment to the
rational character of law. That commitment to public, authoritative statements of purpose provides a critical building block and analogy for
regulatory interpretation.
The starting premise of legal process theory is that law is an institution
designed and directed toward solving the basic problems of social coopera-

tion. "Law is a doing of something," Hart and Sacks write, "a purposive
' 74
activity, a continuous striving to solve the basic problems of social living,"'
maintaining social order and "maximizing the total satisfactions of valid
human wants."'1 75 Not only does law itself have this fundamental normative
aim, but that aim defines all aspects of the legal system. "It can be accepted

as a fixed premise," Hart and Sacks posit, "that every statute and every doctrine of unwritten law ... has some kind of purpose or objective.' 1 76 Hart
and Sacks understand these purposes to be rational, as judged by the way in
172. DUXBURY, supra note 139, at 207 (noting that principles of legal process jurisprudence are "remarkably difficult to pin down"); Young, supra note 52, at 1381 (noting same).
173. See HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at cxxxvii (commenting on ambitions for teaching materials).
174. Id. at 148; see also id. at 104-05 (As "societies are made up of human beings striving to satisfy their respective wants under conditions of interdependence," the purpose of law
is to "maximize the total satisfaction of valid human wants."). See also DUXBURY, supra note
139, at 254-55 (arguing that legal process's jurisprudential project takes as a given that law
aims to maximize human satisfaction); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 137, at xci.
175. HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 104; see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 137,
at liii ("Hart and Sacks went well beyond the traditional law story ... and told a new one: law
is essential to the satisfaction of basic human wants.., and to the advancement of humankind.
Law is or ought to be goal-oriented, rational, and dynamic.").
176. HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 148; see also HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at
1124 ("The idea of a statute without an intelligible purpose is foreign to the idea of law and
inadmissible."); DUXBURY, supra note 139, at 205 (noting that legal process jurisprudence
marks the start of American attempts to explain legal decisionmaking in terms of reason embodied in the fabric of the law); Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative
Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 567, 579 (1992) ("In the legal process framework, all law is purposive. This claim encompassed statutes, as well as other forms of law." (footnote omitted)).
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which they further the basic objectives of law and fit into the surrounding
legal order.177 Because law itself has an overriding aim, it makes sense that
"[any particular legal directive must be seen and interpreted in light of the
17 8
whole body of law"'
Hart and Sacks invoke two subsidiary principles to implement their rationalist conception of law and justify their approach to statutory
interpretation. The first, the principle of institutional settlement, is a principle of respect for the decisions that follow from institutions with established
power to make those decisions acting in accordance with accepted procedures. The principle "expresses the judgment that decisions which are the
duly arrived at result of duly established procedures of this kind ought to be
accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and until they are duly
changed."'179 In other words, we treat the enactment of a statute or a judicial
decision as binding in view of our acceptance of those institutions having
the power to bind through specified procedures.8 0 "When the principle of
institutional settlement is plainly applicable," Hart and Sacks write, "we say
that the law 'is' l thus and so, and brush aside further discussion of what it
'ought' to be."'' But that is really "a statement that ... a decision which is
the duly arrived at result of a duly established procedure for making decisions of that kind 'ought' to be accepted as binding."'182 For Hart and Sacks,
this principle of respect for decisions made through established procedures
represents a basic response to the problem of coordination in a complex society. "[E]stablishment of regularized and peaceable methods of decision,"
as expressed in the principle of institutional settlement, is for Hart and
Sacks, "[t]he alternative to disintegrating resort to violence.' 18 3 Accepting
the decisions of duly authorized institutions plays a part in furthering Hart
and Sacks's rational conception of law because of the settlement and coordination functions that the principle serves.
The second principle, reasoned elaboration, describes the process of reasoning that directly appeals to the purposive and rational character of law.
Reasoned elaboration applies to all officials,' 84 though Hart and Sacks center
their exposition on the judge, whether acting in a common law mode or interpreting enacted law. The duty of reasoned elaboration applies only if
there is genuine "uncertainty" in the law; "[riespect for the principle of
177.

See

HART

&

SACKS,

supra note 27, at 102.

178. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm,47 VAND. L.
REv. 953, 965 (1994); see also HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 147 ("[Tlhe official should
interpret [the legal directive] in the way which best harmonizes with more basic principles and
policies of law.").
179. HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 4.
180. Id. at5.
181. Id.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id. at4.
See id. at 146-47.

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 111:355

institutional settlement demands this."' 85 Once it is clear that uncertainty
exists, reasoned elaboration involves a complex reasoning process. The official must, on the one hand, "elaborate the arrangement in a way which is
consistent with other established applications of it,"'1 8 6 and at the same time,
"do so in the way which best serves the purposes and policies it expresses, 187 including, if there is doubt as to the specific purpose, interpreting it to
"best harmonize[] with more basic principles and policies of law."'' 88 Wherever there is genuine uncertainty as to the application of the law, reasoned
elaboration requires the decisionmaker to directly further the rational policy
of the law, subject to the constraint of what has clearly been decided (as required by the principle of institutional settlement).
The principles of institutional settlement and reasoned elaboration explain the structure of Hart and Sacks's theory of purposive statutory
interpretation and the grounds for their two-step approach to discerning purpose. Institutional settlement, not reasoned elaboration, makes the text the
primary source for inferring purpose and justifies its checking role to ensure
that the posited purpose is a permissible one. 189 Reasoned elaboration intervenes to elaborate the law within the boundaries of what the text permits; it
asks the judge to directly implement the grounding values of law-its coherence and rationality-to fit the statute within the existing body of law.
But contrary to the common characterization of Hart and Sacks's approach,
reasoned elaboration alone does not explain the legal process's interpretative
technique. It operates only in the interpretive space left open after the operation of the principle of institutional settlement.
These principles also illuminate differences between textualist and legal
process purposivist approaches to text. Both theories prioritize text, but do
so for different reasons. For contemporary textualists, the priority of text
derives from an account of legislative supremacy. 90 Because the text of the
statute alone is what passes through the constitutionally prescribed process
of bicameralism and presentment, textualists argue that it represents the best
reflection of the "scope and limits" of the legislative compromise reached, 19'
and thus that textualism provides an appealing conception of legislative su92
premacy. 1
For legal process purposivists, the emphasis they place on statutory text
follows from more general premises about the character of law. For Hart and
Sacks, attention to text is required by the principle of institutional settlement; it is an aspect of recognizing the coordinating role of adherence to the
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
1374-80.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
For a summary of Hart and Sacks's approach to statutory interpretation, see id. at
See Manning, supra note 134, at 99-108.
id. at 104.
See id. at 103-04.
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decisions of authorized institutions, which is itself an aspect of the idea that
law itself aims to solve the basic problems of social living. 93 This is not to
say that legal process purposivism does not provide an account of legislative
supremacy. It does. Whether through attention to Congress's enacted statement of purpose or by inferring purpose, the court aims to implement the
policy that Congress adopted.' 94 But this conception of faithful agency follows from a more general understanding of the nature of law and the role of
institutional settlement within it. The very generality of these premises also
suggests the possibility for further applications.
IV. PURPOSIVE

REGULATORY INTERPRETATION

This Part defends a purposive method of regulatory interpretation modeled on Hart and Sacks's approach to statutory interpretation. As to the
technique of interpretation, it contends that a regulation's statement of basis
and purpose is best understood as analogous to an enacted statement of purpose for legislation. Based on that analogy, the focus of regulatory
interpretation is on discerning purpose from the statement of basis and purpose. But because statements of basis and purpose are not only more
common but also more detailed than enacted statements of purpose, purposive regulatory interpretation has a different cast than Hart and Sacks's
purposivism in the statutory context. As to the grounds for the approach,
because administrative law imposes greater demands for rationality on regulations than constitutional law imposes on legislation, there is positive law
enforcement for the legal process theory's core presumptions of rationality
as to regulations that is lacking as to legislation. But the purposive technique
has appeal well beyond legal process premises. The technique, I argue, provides a more attractive conception of deference to the agency than a
textualist approach because it uses the grounds the agency provides to justify the regulation as a basis for interpretation, while avoiding many
objections that textualists have raised against Hart and Sacks's purposivism
as an approach to statutory interpretation.
A. PurposiveRegulatory Interpretation:The Technique
Our initial inquiry into the legal character of regulations suggested, as
starting points, that a goal of regulatory interpretation is to implement the
purpose or aim of the regulation, and that the privileged interpretive sources
are the regulatory text and accompanying statement of basis and purpose.
Hart and Sacks's theory provides a model for integrating those elements into
a comprehensive interpretive technique. The basic elements of the technique
could track those of a purposive approach to statutes: the court's aim is to
discern the purpose of the regulation and its provisions, and to interpret the
HART & SACKS, supra note 27; see also sources cited supra note 174.
194. See Manning, supra note 134, at 71-72 (providing an account of how purposivism
provides a conception of legislative supremacy).
193.

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 111:355

regulation to carry out those purposes to the extent permitted by its text
while remaining consistent with policies and principles of clear statement. 195
As to the implementation of this approach, the critical difference between regulations and statutes is how the court discerns purposes. With
regard to statutes, Hart and Sacks divided the inquiry into an initial consultation of the enacted statement of purpose, and only when such a statement
is lacking or unhelpful, an inference into purpose from a broad range of
sources. 196 Statutes, however, are frequently enacted without statements of
purpose. 1 97 As a result, with regard to statutes, the paradigm for discerning
purpose for a statute involves inferring purpose from a broad array of
sources. This highlights that the critical appraisal of Hart and Sacks has a
point: with the majority of statutes enacted without statements of purpose,
purposive statutory interpretation will typically require the court to attribute,
through broad inferences from the text and policy context, a reasonable aim
of the legislation or its provisions.
In contrast, the administrative process generates much more consistent
resources, analogous to enacted statements of purpose, for attributing purpose to regulations. With narrow exceptions, agencies must issue statements
of basis and purpose for their rule to be procedurally valid,' 98 and the standards of judicial review make the agency's reasoning necessary to the validity
of their rules.' 99 In response to these demands, agencies today issue statements of basis and purpose that are far from mere preambles; they are
extremely detailed rationales for, and explanations of, their regulations.
These explanations ordinarily include the agency's analysis of the data, how
that data supports their regulations, the justification of the agency's choices
in view of alternatives, how the regulations meet statutory purposes, and
195. Hart and Sacks's principle that statutory interpretation must be consistent with
policies of clear statement has not been as controversial as other aspects of their theory, or at
least current doctrines of statutory interpretation include many substantive canons, presumptions, and clear statement rules that could fit within this general category. See, e.g., LISA
SCHULTZ BRESSMAN, EDWARD L. RUBIN, & KEvIN M. STACK, THE REGULATORY STATE 23975 (2010) (providing an overview of substantive canons and clear statement rules). As a result,
I do not single this part of their theory out for discussion with regard to regulatory interpretation. For an illuminating argument that the canon of constitutional avoidance has a
justification independent of the court-legislative relationship that applies to executive branch
actors, see Trevor W. Morrison, ConstitutionalAvoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1189 (2006).
196. See HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1377. Hart and Sacks write, "In all other
situations, the purpose of a statute has in some degree to be inferred," clearly suggesting the
priority of enacted statements of purpose. Id.
197. In the 107th, 108th, 109th, 110th, and 111th Congresses, for instance, fewer than
13% of the public laws included an enacted statement of purpose section. Original Research
by Kevin M. Stack (on file with author).

198.

See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) (requiring agency rules to be issued with an accompa-

nying statement of basis and purpose).
199. See supra text accompany notes 114-126.
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engagement with commentators. 2 00 Moreover, the agency typically provides
some explanation as to each regulatory provision or choice. When an agency
does not offer a provision-specific justification, the statement typically includes a justification of the purpose at a higher level of generality-as it
must for the regulation to be valid.
A run-of-the-mill regulation issued by the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") on manipulations in the wholesale fuels market provides an illustration. 20 1 The regulation makes it unlawful for any person, in connection
with wholesale purchases or sales of fuels, to knowingly engage in an act
that operates as a fraud or to intentionally fail to state a material fact that
renders a statement misleading. 02 At a general level, the FTC justified the
regulation as helping to protect the integrity of the market. 2°3 The FTC devoted the bulk of the statement to providing provision-specific explanations
and justifications of each aspect of the regulation, from the definition of the
covered fuels and the relevant wholesale market to the standard of liability.2" As to the regulatory definition of "knowingly" for overtly deceptive
conduct, the FTC explained that it adopted the extreme recklessness standard set forth by the Seventh Circuit in the securities context,2"' because "it
provides for both effective rule enforcement and clarity to market participants. ' 20 6 In this regard, the FTC advised that because there is a "less well
defined" standard of ordinary care in the wholesale petroleum market than
in the securities market, "a departure from 'ordinary care' is not required" to
prove scienter under its rule. 2 7 Likewise, the FTC justified the "higher scienter standard" of "[i]ntentionally mislead[ing]" to "address concerns that
the initially proposed Rule would chill legitimate
business activity" 2 8 and
29
particular.
in
deter voluntary disclosures
It is not hard to imagine how these provision-specific justificationsclarity for market participants, efficacy of the rule's enforcement, absence of a
200.

KERWIN

&

FURLONG,

statements of basis and purpose);

supra note 3, at 64-65 (characterizing typical contents of
NAT'L ARCHIVES

& RECORDS ADMIN., supra note 4, at 2-17

(noting topics to include in statement of basis and purpose); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 50 (1983) (requiring consideration of technological alternatives to proposed regulation among other reasoned analysis to survive hard-look

review).
201.
Prohibitions on Market Manipulation, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,686 (Aug. 12, 2009) (to be
codified at 16 C.FR. pt. 317).
202. Id. at 40,702 (reproducing issued rule, 16 C.F.R. § 317.3).
203. The FTC wrote that "[b]ecause fraudulent or deceptive conduct within the wholesale petroleum markets injects false information into the market process, it distorts [the]
market data .... As a consequence ... economic efficiency declines in the overall economy."
Id. at 40,688 (stating that the Commission issued the rule "[f]or these reasons").
204.

Id. 40,691-700.

207.
207.
207.

Id.
Id.
Id.

208.
209.

Id. at 40,693.
Id.
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requirement for showing a deviation from ordinary care, maintaining a difference between the standards for statements and omission, and concerns about

chilling voluntary disclosures--could be used by lawyers and courts to understand the scope of the rule's prohibitions in relation to the rule's general
purposes. And even where a specific justification did not pertain, the more
general grounding of the regulation in protecting the integrity of the markets suggests a guidepost for interpretation. This is not to say that these
statements eliminate the need for interpretative judgments about how to
balance the overall aims of the regulations, the provision-specific justifications, and the text. But in contrast to statutes, it will be a relatively rare
case in which the statement of basis and purpose provides no guidance on
an interpretive question, either in a specific or more general justification for
210
the regulation.
To the extent that courts and commentators have considered the interpretive role of the agency's statement of basis and purpose, they have generally

seen it as analogous to a legislative committee report2" or statutory preamble. 212 But the better analogy is to an enacted statement of purpose. In scope
and detail, the analogy to legislative committee reports makes a lot of sense
(as it does for those who embrace the bearing of committee reports for legislative interpretation). But treating statements of basis and purpose as
analogous to legislative committee reports neglects critical differences be-

tween these agency statements and legislative reports. Most important is that
the agency's statement of basis and purpose is itself necessary to the validity
of a regulation, whereas legislative committee reports are not. Further,

whereas legislative committee reports are statements of a subgroup of legislators and not made on behalf of the institution, statements of basis and
purpose, like enacted statements of purposes, speak for the agency, not a

subgroup or committee.21 3

210. One circumstance in which the statement of basis and purpose will not provide
useful guidance is when it contradicts the text of the regulation, in which case the text of the
regulation trumps. See, e.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 U.S. 519, 532 (2009) (concluding that a passage in the statement of basis and purpose of the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency "cannot be reconciled with the regulation[]").
211. See, e.g., United States v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 563 F.2d 1008, 1013 (10th Cir.
1977) ("The [agency preamble] is a summary of what, in the legislative process, would be
gleaned from the hearings and statements of position which make up the legislative history.");
Noah, supra note 7, at 311-12 (arguing that regulatory preambles are not analogous to enacted
statements of purpose but are better seen as akin to ratified legislative history).
212. See, e.g., Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 53 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (concluding that the same principles govern the import of regulatory preambles and
statutory preambles for regulatory and statutory interpretation, respectively).
213. For single-headed agencies, this is obvious: they are issued in the name of the head
of the agency or the office vested with power by statute. For multiheaded agencies and commissions, the agency's statement of basis and purpose still provides the agency's authoritative
statement on the regulation, issued in the agency's own name, even if it prompts dissenting or
concurring statements from one of the agency's commissioners or board members. See, e.g.,
Prohibitions on Market Manipulation, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,686, 40,702 (Aug. 12, 2009) (concurring statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch) (agreeing with issuing 16 C.ER. pt. 317
but expressing misgivings about the FTC's rationale for the rule).
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So what does this regulatory purposive technique look like? The central

tenet of the approach is to read the text of the regulation in light of the regulation's statement of basis and purpose. The D.C. Circuit's decision in Secretary
of Labor,Mine Safety & Health Administration ex rel. Bushnell v. Cannelton
Industries, Inc.,2 14 delivered by then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, provides a
nice illustration. The Secretary of Labor had issued regulations to protect

miners with pneumoconiosis, a lung disease, providing that miners with evidence of pneumoconiosis could obtain a transfer to a position with lower
dust concentrations. 215 In addition, the regulations protected the miners'

compensation, providing that "[w]henever" such a miner is transferred "the
operator shall compensate the miner at not less than the regular rate of pay
received by that miner immediately before the transfer."216 In the case at
issue, the eligible miner had initially been transferred to work as a dispatch-

er at his mining wage, and then to an inside laborer position at a reduced
wage as part of a general realignment due to economic conditions.217 The

question was whether the regulations protected the miner from compensation decreases solely for transfers to meet the respiratory dust standards, as
the employer maintained, or for all subsequent transfers, as the Secretary
218
maintained.
The court agreed with the Secretary, finding the Secretary's position
"consistent" with the regulations' text ("whenever") and also "fully consonant" with the "administrative history and purposes. '219 The court relied on

both the general and more specific purposes set forth in the Secretary's
statement of basis and purpose for the regulations. At a general level, the
court noted that the Secretary had observed that existing law discouraged

eligible miners from claiming protections, and had sought in the regulations
to "provide eligible miners with significant additional protections against
fears of job security, adverse economic consequences," and other undesirable working and wage conditions. 220 More specifically, as the court noted,
the Secretary's statement of basis and purpose had stated that an eligible
For provocative arguments that legislative history is relevant to statutory interpretation
because it is attributable to the institution as a public justification for the legislation, see Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public JustificationApproach
to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 82-88 (1999), or because Congress can be
thought of as incorporating those materials as useful to interpretation when it passes a law, see
Robert A. Katzmann, Statutes, 87 N.YU. L. REV. 637, 681 (2012). From these premises, the
argument for relying on an agency's statement of basis and purpose as a privileged source in
regulatory interpretation is even stronger.
214. 867 F2d 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
215.
Cannelton, 867 F.2d at 1434 (characterizing 30 C.F.R. pt. 90).
216. 30 C.ER. § 90.103(b) (2011), quoted in Cannelton, 867 F.2d at 1434.
217. Cannelton, 867 F.2d at 1434 (reducing the wage from $133.28 per eight-hour shift
before realignment to $104.78 per eight-hour shift after realignment).
218. Id. at 1436.
219. Id. at 1438.
220. See id. at 1438-39 (quoting Coal Miners Who Have Evidence of the Development
of Pneumoconiosis, 45 Fed. Reg. 80,760, 80,763 (Dec. 5, 1980) (statement of basis and purpose to final rule)).
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miner, "'should not suffer any loss in pay whenever an operator transfers
the miner' because 'Ji]f any eligible miner perceived that their rate of pay
could be decreased upon any transfer, the incentive to exercise the Part 90
option would be reduced.'"221 The court found that these grounds "strongly
support[ed]" the Secretary's reading of the regulations to protect against
wage decreases given that existing law already protected the miner's rate of
pay upon initial transfer to less dusty work. 22 2 The court thus located a reading of the regulations that was both permitted by the text and that carried out
the regulations' purposes, which the court discerned from the regulations'
statement of basis and purpose.
This purposive technique, grounded in the distinctive character of regulations, builds on Hart and Sacks's model. By treating the agency's text and
the statement of basis and purpose as the focus of interpretation, it respects
the principle of institutional settlement. And because statements of basis and
purpose are both more consistently produced and more detailed than enacted
statutory statements of purpose, purposive regulatory interpretation more
frequently dwells on inferences from those statements, and less frequently
requires a broader-ranging, independent reconstruction of rational purpose.
This technique, I argue in the next Sections, follows from legal process
premises but also has broader appeal.
B. PurposiveRegulatory Interpretation:Legal Process Grounds

Based on legal process premises, there is a stronger argument for the
purposive technique for regulations than for statutes. As a theory of statutory
interpretation, Hart and Sacks's approach foundered on its counsel that the
court act as if the legislature had reasonable purposes and pursued those
purposes reasonably in legislation.
What distinguishes regulations from statutes is their governance by administrative law. As the inquiry into the legal character of regulations in Part
II revealed, administrative law imposes uniquely high demands of rationality on regulations (along with other forms of agency action). Hard-look
review imposes a higher standard of rationality as a condition of validity
22 3
than the minimum standard applied in constitutional review of legislation.
And the Chenery requirement that regulations be upheld only on the basis of
reasons the agency provided when the regulations were issued imposes a
higher standard of reason-giving than applies to statutes or other forms of
224
lawmaking.
221.

See id. at 1439 (alteration in original) (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. at 80,766 (statement of

basis and purpose to final rule)).
222. Id. The purposive approach thus has "some foundation in experience and in the best
practice[s] of the wisest judges,' HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1169, qualities Hart and
Sacks sought to achieve in their own approach to statutory interpretation. See id.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 114-122.
224.

See supra text accompanying notes 123-126.
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In addition, centralized regulatory review, required by executive orders
issued by every president since President Reagan, polices the rationality of
regulations in a way that does not apply to statutes. Each president's regulatory review executive order has required a detailed assessment of the costs
and benefits for significant regulations as well as a cost-benefit analysis 22
of6
alternative courses of action 22 5 to the extent that they may be quantified,
and a statement of the agency's regulatory objectives and the means it has
selected to pursue those objectives.22 7 While the practice of regulatory review has been controversial, at least in principle its elements speak directly
policy choices within the
to the demand that regulations reflect reasonable
2 28
agency's permissible range of discretion.
Administrative law thus gives the presumption of rationality a foundation with regard to regulations that is lacking for legislation; it provides
positive law enforcement of the very qualities of purposeful rationality that
Hart and Sacks ascribe to law in general and the legislature in particular.
The reasonable legislature may be a wistful abstraction; at the very least,
positive constitutional law does not require the legislature to act as reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably. The same is not true
for regulations. Administrative law requires regulators to act as reasonable
persons, pursuing reasonable purposes within the permissible range of their
discretion. 229 By making rational, purposive action a condition for the validity of regulations, administrative law provides positive law enforcement of
the legal process presumption of rationality.2 30 In short, legal process theorists have reasons to adopt purposive regulatory interpretation.
This argument of relative strength-that, in view of administrative law's
high rationality demands, there is a stronger case for regulations satisfying
legal process premises than there is for statutes-will not be persuasive to
those who view administrative action, like legislation, as best explained by
225.

See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735-36 (Oct. 4,

1993).
226.

See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 1(b), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011)

(adopting and supplementing Executive Order 12,866 prescribing as a general principle of
regulation that alternatives maximize net benefits); see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXEC. OFFCE oF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4, at 27 (2003), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatorymatters-pdf/a-4.pdf (providing
agency guidance on how to handle costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify).
227.

See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b), 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,735-36.

228.

See, e.g., id.

229.

See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REv. 135, 136-37 (2010) (argu-

ing that the multiple standards of review of agency action amount to a "reasonable agency"
standard).
230. Interestingly, to the extent that Hart and Sacks's theory augmented the development
of demands for reasoned elaboration in administrative law, their theory provided the grounds

for regulations to be even stronger candidates for purposive interpretation than statutes. See,
e.g., Werhan, supra note 176, at 576-89 ("The legal process approach shaped the traditional
model of administrative law and provided the consensus necessary to sustain it[, including the
Administrative Procedure Act.]"); cf G. EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT

145-47 (1978),
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political economy and public choice theory.2 3 1 From this perspective, the fact
that the law might make rational justification a condition of validity for regulations in ways that it does not for legislation does not demonstrate the law's
efficacy or that regulations are best understood as having rational purposes.
These critics, however, are not likely to be persuaded by any justification for
an interpretive technique that builds on legal process premises.
C. Deference and Commitment in PurposiveRegulatory Interpretation
This purposive technique of regulatory interpretation, though an adaptation of Hart and Sacks's approach, has appeal independent from legal
process premises. It allocates judicial deference to the agency in a manner
consistent with fundamental values in administrative law, while also providing a reliable rule-of-law constraint on the regulation's meaning.
Under the purposive approach, the court is not to determine its own best
reading of the regulation's text or its own best construction of the regulation's purposes by looking only at the regulation's text. Instead, the court
determines the regulation's purpose by discerning the agency's own understanding of that purpose, as reflected both in the regulatory text and the
agency's statement of basis and purpose. That allocates a strong form of
judicial deference, in the sense of judicial acceptance, to the agency's own
authoritative statement of the rationale, objectives, and limits of the regulation.
Allocating deference to this object-the agency's authoritative and deliberative justification for the regulation-has deep grounding in
administrative law. As we have seen, the validity of an agency's lawmaking
actions depends on the agency's contemporaneous statement of reasons.
Likewise, deference to the agency's statutory construction under Chevron is
premised on the agency working through the regulatory problem and explaining its policy.232 As reflected in the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Mead Corp.,233 statutory authority alone is not sufficient to warrant
deference under Chevron; the agency's reason-giving is a precondition to,
and the object of, deference. 23 4 In other words, the agency's reasoned analy231. See JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION? THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 25 (2002) (summarizing political
science literature examining congressional, presidential, and other influences over bureaucratic outcomes); B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of PoliticalControl of the
Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 801, 822 (1991) ("[E]vidence for active political control
is so strong .... [that fluture research should turn toward exploring the determinants of political control.").
232. Stack, supra note 24, at 1005 ("[A] court should not defer to an agency's construction of a statute at Chevron Step Two unless the agency embraced a construction at the time it
acted, not merely in litigation.").
233. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
234.

Mead, 533 U.S. at 228.
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sis is the coin by which it pays for (and warrants) deference to its interpreta23
tion of the law. 1
The purposive approach to regulatory interpretation draws on these same
principles. In particular, it treats the same statements that are the object of
deference under Chevron as an authoritative basis for discerning the regulation's purpose. This interpretive approach grants agency deliberation, at
least as reflected in statements of basis and purpose, a dual role and reward.
Not only is the agency's discursive statement of basis and purpose necessary
to the validity of its regulations, but it also provides grounds for interpretation. Indeed, the sources of the regulation's validation form the sources for
its interpretation. This feature should be attractive to those who view incentives for agency deliberation as a defining feature of judicial review of
23 6
agency action.
It also marks a difference between a purposive approach and an
approach relying exclusively on the regulation's text. Relying exclusively on
the regulation's text as a basis for interpretation isolates regulatory
interpretation from foundational administrative law commitments. On a
textualist approach, the agency's most considered assessment of the basis for
the regulation and its scope is set aside when interpreting the regulation,
despite the fact that the same analysis forms the basis of judicial deference to
the agency when determining the validity of the agency's regulation under
Chevron and arbitrariness review. The textualist approach thus makes a sharp
distinction between the bearing of the agency's statutory interpretation and
policy analysis for assessing the regulation's validity, on the one hand, and the
implications of that same analysis for the scope and meaning of the agency's
regulation, on the other. In contrast, the purposive approach denies that
distinction. It treats the agency's most considered analysis of the regulation as
no less entitled to deference when the question is the meaning of the
regulation than when the question is the regulation's validity. At the same
time, it highlights the dependence of validity determinations on regulatory
interpretation.
The purposive approach thus implements respect for the agency's statutory interpretation in a way that a textualist approach does not. Statements
of basis and purpose reflect, among other things, the agency's choices about
statutory interpretation; these statements typically explain the aims of the
regulation and its provisions in light of the agency's reading of the authorizing statute. By reading the regulation in light of the statement of basis and
purpose, the purposive approach builds deference to the agency's statutory
interpretation into the method of regulatory interpretation. A textualist approach, in contrast, does not incorporate consideration of the agency's
235. See id.
236. Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn, for instance, argue that "the Supreme Court
should openly announce deliberation as a plus factor in judicial review." EsKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 40, at 265. The purposive approach to regulatory interpretation dovetails
nicely with their view in part because it provides a similar incentive for agency deliberation
provided by administrative law's requirements for deliberative statement, and could operate
alongside those doctrines.
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statutory interpretation into the interpretation of its regulations in this way;
the focus instead is the court's construction of the text of the regulation,
likely in light of the court's reading of the statute. To the extent that agenrespect from
cies' distinctive approaches to statutory interpretation merit
23 7

courts, this is an attractive feature of the purposive method.
While the purposive approach grants this strong form of deference to the
agency's own account of the purposes of the regulation and reading of its
statute, it also holds the agency to those purposes in a way that relying
merely on the regulation's text does not. By interpreting the regulation in
view of its initial justification, the purposive approach treats the reasons offered to justify a regulation as more than just a time-consuming nuisance
necessary to survive judicial review. Instead, it views those reasons as creating commitments regarding the scope of the regulation's application and
interpretation by which the agency must adhere.
Understanding the agency's reason-giving as creating commitments has
theoretical grounding. As Frederick Schauer explains, the social practice of
giving reasons for a decision involves making a commitment, typically to "a
principle of greater generality than the decision itself."23 8 As Schauer argues,
in law, the practice of giving reasons creates a prima facie commitment to
237.

Admittedly, this purposive approach to regulatory interpretation does not resolve

the puzzle that Jerry Mashaw has called the "paradox of deference," though it may help to
manage that paradox. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices,and the Paradox of Deference: A
Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 537-38
(2005). A growing literature notices that courts and agencies engage in statutory interpretation
differently. See Herz, supra note 137; Mashaw, supra; Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory
Interpretation by Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW
285 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010); Peter L. Strauss, When the
Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretationand the
Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 321 (1990). The difference between
agency and judicial approaches to statutory interpretation raises the paradox of how "an authentically deferential judicial posture" in review of agency action is possible. Mashaw, supra,
at 537.
The purposive approach to regulatory interpretation would ameliorate this paradox. See
Mashaw, supra, at 541-42 (suggesting other doctrines that mitigate the paradox). At least with
regard to interpreting regulations, the purposive approach narrows the gap between agency
and judicial approaches by requiring a court to reach its independent construction of the regulation's meaning in view of the agency's statement of the purposes and limits of the regulation.
While there is still room for difference between agency and judicial views, that space for disagreement is smaller than if the court were to arrive at its own interpretation of the regulation
without an obligation to do so in light of the agency's statement of basis and purpose. Moreover, because the purposive approach is grounded in part in the distinctive legal character of
regulations, as defined by administrative law, it has potential to appeal to judges with textualist
commitments as to the reading of statutes. Cf Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation and
Decision Theory, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 329, 363-66 (2007) (questioning whether textualist
judges should defer to purposivist agency statutory interpretations or purposivist judges
should defer to textualist agency statutory interpretations).
238. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47
omitted).

STAN.

L. Rv. 633, 641 (1995) (emphasis
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other applications falling within the scope of the reason.2 39 There are
particularly strong grounds for viewing the reasons an agency offers to
justify a regulation in its statement of basis and purpose as creating a
prima facie commitment to interpretations that fall within the scope of the
reasons the agency offered. Most importantly, the agency is required to
state these reasons, and knows and intends that the reasons it provides will
form the basis for the evaluation of the regulation's validity. The purposive
approach recognizes these features of the practice of reason-giving by
treating the justifications the agency has explicitly and formally offered
for its action as creating a commitment to a principle of greater generality
24
and a basis for interpreting its regulation. 0
In sum, for a textualist, the grounds offered in the statement of basis and
purpose are relevant for judging the regulation's validity, but have no necessary connection to the meaning of the regulation. In contrast to relying
solely on the regulation's text, the purposive approach treats the agency's
justifications as conditioning, limiting, and guiding how the regulation is to
be interpreted.
D. Responding to Textualist Challenges

Textualists have mounted significant challenges to purposivism, and in
particular to Hart and Sacks's purposivism, as a theory of statutory interpretation. 241 But because regulatory purposivism relies on the agency's own
statement of basis and purpose to discern the regulation's purposes, it avoids
the central objections that textualists have made to purposivism, including
the coherence of purpose, problems of fair notice, and difficulties in ascertaining the generality of purpose.
1. The Coherence of Purpose. Relying on public choice theory, textualists argue that legislation frequently lacks a purpose other than that
ascertainable in the text. This challenge begins with two basic premises.
First, Congress itself is a multimember body.2 42 Second, individuals or
239. Id. at 648-51, 656 (defending the commitment model of reason-giving in law and
noting that "[h]aving given a reason, the reason-giver has, by virtue of an existing social practice, committed herself to deciding those cases within the scope of the reason in accordance
with the reason").
240. Cf David Dyzenhaus & Michael Taggart, Reasoned Decisions and Legal Theory, in
COMMON LAw THEORY 134, 165 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007) ("[T]o require reasons from
such [administrative] officials is to imply that they have an important role in interpreting the
law, a role that judges with others should respect as long as the officials do a decent job of
justifying their decisions.").
241. There are many ways to isolate the distinction between purposivists and textualists.
See, e.g., Molot, supra note 28, at 25. Michael Herz argues that textualist challenges to purposivism as an approach to judicial statutory interpretation do not apply with the same force to
purposive agency statutory interpretation. See Herz, supra note 137. My discussion of textualist objections to purposivism builds on the categories of textualist objections to purposivism
that Herz identifies.
242. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 533, 547-48 (1983)
(noting that it is difficult "to aggregate individual [legislators' views] into a coherent collective
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groups of legislators frequently have different policy purposes for enacting
the legislation. From these two premises, textualists argue that legislation
frequently lacks an agreed-upon purpose, and accordingly that an account of
statutory interpretation which makes discerning the purpose of a statute a
central feature does not provide an attractive account of the judge as a faithful agent of the legislature.
It is important to first notice the limitation of this objection with regard to
statutes. The objection addresses the attribution of purpose only where the
statute does not include an enacted statement of purpose. When the legislation
includes such a statement, it does not make sense to argue that Congress did
not have an agreed-upon purpose: the purpose is stated in the text, enacted
by the same authorized procedures as the rest of the statutory text. In this
light, the objection that "purpose" is an incoherent abstraction with regard to
legislation has little force with regard to regulations. For a regulation, the
agency's statement of basis and purpose, like an enacted statement of purpose in a statute, provides an authoritative and public statement of the
grounds and purposes of the regulation. 243 To the extent that the court is
consulting the statement of basis and purpose, it is not attributing a purpose
that the agency has not adopted; rather, it is discerning the duly agreed-upon
statement of purpose, just as a court does (or should do) when faced with an
enacted statement of purpose. Because the statement of basis and purpose is
the agency's official statement on the grounds of the regulation, it responds
comprehensively to the multimember problem.
2. Discerning Purpose and FairNotice. Textualists argue that legislative

purpose, even if coherent, is difficult for judges to discern. Especially when
there is no enacted statement of legislative purpose, purposivism requires
the judge to attribute purpose through a complex operation of synthetic reasoning, evaluating the particular provision against the statute's text, the
background law at enactment, and the law's ongoing changes and established application. This capacious conception of the context relevant to
discerning purpose has bolstered several objections.
At a practical level, textualists suggest that this wide-ranging inquiry
ends up producing more judicial errors in discerning Congress's commands
choice"); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2410-13
(2003); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV.L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
Interestingly, while legal positivism is often associated with a formalist or textualist
SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 253 (2011), as Scott Shapiro
writes, purposes may have "social sources and hence possess the appropriate positivist pedigree." Id. The reliance on public statements of purpose, such as statements of basis and
purpose, presents an especially strong case for purposes having an appropriate positivist pedigree. The purposive approach to regulatory interpretation would appear to be consistent with a
jurisprudential theory, like Shapiro's, that understands legal systems as particular types of
institutions for social planning, see id. at 171, and looks to the objectives of the planners in
light of judgments about competence and character as the source for interpretive methodology.
See id. at 382.
243.

method of interpretation, see
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than consulting only statutory text. 2' Adrian Vermeule presents a version of
this challenge that focuses on the use of legislative history, a source that
statutory purposivism permits. 245 He argues that the volume of legislative
history and its heterogeneity (including many different types of sources at
different levels of generality) interact to create distinctive risks of error for
time-pressed generalist judges.246 Legislative history frequently ranges over
thousands of pages and includes everything from committee reports and
floor statements to committee transcripts, sponsors' statements, studies, and
multiple drafts. Ferreting out the salient actors in this wide and varied do247
main, Vermeule argues, poses a systematic risk of error.
Closely related, the synthetic and creative judgment required to attribute
purpose to a statute has long prompted the objection that purposivism makes
it difficult to discern whether the judge has "confus[ed] his own policy
24
views with those of Congress.""
Textualists contend that focusing on a
more limited set of sources and statutory text in particular provides a more
manageable account of the judicial role and reduces the risk of conflating
the judge's preferred outcome and that of the legislature. 249 At stake is not
just the capacity of judges to be faithful agents of Congress but also rule-oflaw values of fair notice.2 50 If purposivism's synthetic demands allow judges
too much leeway in attributing legislative purpose, it will undermine the
capacity of the regulated to understand their legal obligations.
These objections do not apply with the same force to purposive interpretation of regulation. As we have seen, the purposive approach requires the court
to examine the text of the regulation in relation to its statement of basis and
purpose. In general, the statement of basis and purpose not only describes the
general aim of the regulation, but also the specific rationale for principal
choices reflected in its provisions. While there will be instances in which the
purposes of the regulation articulated by the agency will conflict, the demands
of hard-look review continue to press agencies to provide coherent as well
244. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 110-11 (2006) (arguing that consulting legislative history increases incidents of judicial error in ways not shared
by statutory text).
245. HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1379 (suggesting that legislative history may be
consulted for the light it sheds on the general purpose of the statute).
246. VERMEULE, supra note 244, at 107-15 (arguing that volume and heterogeneity of
legislative history creates distinct risk of errors of information and errors of evaluation); see
also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1185
(1989) ("[W]hen one does not have a solid textual anchor.., from which to derive the general
rule, its pronouncement appears uncomfortably like legislation.").
247. VERMEULE, supra note 244, at 110-12.
248. Molot, supra note 28, at 27 (characterizing this textualist objection to purposivism).
249. Scalia, supra note 246, at 1185; Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 74, 79 (2000); see also Molot, supra note 28, at 26 (noting that textualists seek to minimize judicial leeway by "emphasizing statutory text over statutory purposes, and by excluding
legislative history in particular").
250. Herz, supra note 137, at 101.
251. See VERMEULE, supra note 244, at 109.
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as specific justifications for the inferences they make to justify their choices.
Moreover, in contrast to the multiple types of legislative history, statements
of basis and purpose generally appear in a single, highly organized document
with a predictable form, like a judicial opinion.25 2 Accordingly, even though
these statements are often long, judicial reliance on them does not pose the
distinctive risk of error that Vermeule argues heterogeneous legislative
history creates for judicial interpretation of statutes. 2 3 To be sure, reliance
on the statement of basis and purpose alongside the regulation's text will
not eliminate the need for interpretive judgment. But it does structure interpretation around transparent sources and calls on a core capacity of legal
judgment, discerning how articulated underlying purposes shape the meaning and application of legal texts. As a result, the search for the purpose of a
regulation or its provisions will have a fundamentally different cast than
attributing purpose to a statute that lacks an enacted statement of purpose.
3. The Generality Problem. One of the strongest objections to purposivism in statutory interpretation is what John Manning has identified as a
generality problem. "Giving precedence to semantic context (when clear) is
necessary to enable legislators to set the level of generality at which they
wish to express their policies. '254 As Manning explains, in the legislative
process, to facilitate a statute's passage, legislators may compromise on a
statute that does not completely address the perceived mischief or includes
exceptions that curtail the statute's operation.2 5 By granting precedence to
statutory text, the court has a better chance of implementing the legislative
compromise at the level of specificity or generality of the policy compromise. In contrast, "[bly asking what policy a reasonable person would adopt
(rather than how a reasonable person would understand the words)," Manning argues, "purposivist judges make it surpassingly difficult for legislators
the choice of statutory
to bargain" over the choice of rules or standards,25or
6
generality or specificity, in the legislative process.
This generality problem has two implied points of reference relevant to
its implications for purposive regulatory interpretation. First, it addresses
statutes that do not include an enacted statement of purpose. Because Congress frequently does not include such statements, 257 that point of reference
encompasses the lion's share of statutes. But when Congress has enacted a
statement of purpose, the generality problem loses force. In that case, there
will be a genuine question about how the enacted statement influences the
252. 1 C.F.R. § 18.12 (2012) (specifying organization and format for preambles to final
rules); BRESSMAN, RUBIN, & STACK, supra note 195, at 427-31 (describing the standard form
of statements of basis and purpose).
253. Manning, supra note 7, at 663 ("[hf an agency has complied with its duty of explanation ....
judicial interpretation [will be] easier by giving the courts and the regulated public
a somewhat clearer sense of the objectives that a regulation is seeking to achieve.").
254. Manning, supra note 134, at 99.
255.

Id. at 104.

256.
257.

Id. at 105.
See supra note 197.
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statute's specific provisions at issue, but that will be a question for purposivists and for textualists alike. Both the textualist and the purposivist will
endeavor to make inferences from the enacted statement of purpose to the
specific statutory provision. That is a sort of generality problem, but not one
that particularly afflicts purposivism or textualism. It is just part of the labor
of interpretation.
Second, the generality problem addresses the circumstance when a purposivist is interpreting a specific provision in relation to the statute's
overriding purpose or policy. For Hart and Sacks's purposivism, as Manning
notes, that is a fundamental aspect of statutory interpretation. 5 Hart and
Sacks also acknowledge, however, that purposes pertain to specific provisions,
and can be so specific as to resolve "a question of specific application" or so
highly general as to "openly contemplat[e] the exercise of further judgment by
' With regard to legislation, the generality problem will be
the interpreter."259
reduced to the extent that purposes are determined (and determinable) at the
level of specific provisions, not just as an inference from the statute as a
whole.
With these two qualifications of the generality problem with regard to
statutes in mind, it is possible to see that the generality problem for purposivism loses much of its force when applied to regulatory interpretation.
To begin with, purposive regulatory interpretation is more akin to interpretation of a statute with an enacted statement of purpose. If it makes sense to
treat the statement of basis and purpose as a privileged interpretive source,
like an enacted statement of purpose in a statute, then purposive interpretation of regulations does not face a distinctive generality problem. The
purposivist will need to make inferences from stated purposes to specific
provisions, but that work will not be unique to purposivists.
Moreover, at a practical level, as suggested above, statements of basis
and purpose are typically much more specific than statutory statements of
purpose in articulating the rationales of particular provisions. 2" To the extent that a statement of basis and purpose typically includes both a general
statement of the purpose of the regulation as well as provision-by-provision
justifications-including goals to be achieved by particular provisions,
phrases, and definitions-they will inform the level of generality of the
258. See Manning, supra note 134, at 90; see also HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at
1374-78. Recall that Hart and Sacks qualify their approach by permitting only interpretations
"to the extent permitted by its language," a feature of their theory which is often given less
prominence than it deserves. Id.
259. Id. at 1377.
260. When examining regulatory interpretation, Manning also imagines a role for statements of basis and purpose. See Manning, supra note 7, at 690 (concluding, with
qualifications, that consulting statements of basis and purpose can "enhance the clarity of
agency decisionmaking and the accuracy of judicial review"). In that respect, Manning's approach and the purposive method that I defend share common ground. Manning appears to be
less sanguine, however, about the helpfulness of these statements, and thus, one imagines,
about their usefulness in confronting the generality problem. See id. (suggesting that hard-look
review has undermined the usefulness of statements of basis and purpose as sources of explanation of the regulation).
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regulation or its particular provisions. Interpretive work will remain, but
again, not a generality problem distinctive to a purposive approach.
This also highlights the best response to the related objection that administrative regulations, like legislation, are best explained by public choice
theory. From the perspective of this objection, it is wistful to suppose the
efficacy of administrative law in policing the rationality of regulations; political economy, not demands for reasoned elaboration, best explain
regulations' content.2 6 1 In the legislative context, the response to the public
choice account of the legislature has been to emphasize the legislature's
formal enactments as providing the best guidance as to the legislation's
scope and limits. 26 2 The purposive approach to regulation can be defended
on the same grounds. Once the regulatory act is seen as involving both the
text of the regulation and its accompanying explanatory statement, then even
under a public choice conception of regulation, those same materials provide the most reliable guidance as to the meaning and scope of the
regulation.
E. Is This Purposivismor Textualism?
A serious question can be raised about whether this approach to regulatory interpretation is more properly characterized as purposive or
textualist. 263 At the level of specification given thus far, the theory fits under
both mantles, and provides an example of their common ground.
The definitive commitment of textualism in statutory interpretation is
granting precedence to statutory text and its semantic context.2 4 For reasons
261. See supra note 231.
262. Indeed, this is one of the basic underpinnings of contemporary textualism. See
Easterbrook, supra note 242, at 547-48; Manning, supra note 134, at 104. To the extent that
public choice theory shows that the legislative text is a poor proxy for the legislative majority's preferred policy because of vote cycling and other agenda-setting problems, the same may
hold true of statements of basis and purpose for multiheaded agencies. With regard to legislation, a response to this line of public choice critique is that legislation possesses authority
because it is enacted on behalf of the institution, through its authorized procedures. As Jeremy
Waldron explains,
If we think, for example, that ordinary citizens supporting a minority party are bound to
respect legislation sponsored by the majority, it is because they owe that respect to the
legislature, and to the procedures and institutional forms that constitute it, not because
they owe it to the majority as such.

144 (1999). Waldron continues, "The authority
of a law is its emergence, under specified procedures, as a 'unum' out of a plurality of ideas,
concerns, and proposals, in circumstances where we recognize a need for one decision made
together, not many decisions made by each of us alone." Id. The same response holds for
statements of basis and purpose, which are also produced as collective and authoritative actions on behalf of the institution.
263. See Gluck, supra note 2, at 1832-46 (examining whether state courts' practices of
statutory interpretation are better characterized as textualist or purposivist and the stakes of
that label).
264. Gluck, supra note 2, at 1834; Manning, supra note 134, at 91.
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT
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particular to American administrative law, I have argued that it makes sense
to read the text of a regulation in company with the agency's statement of
basis and purpose. In a sense, the suggestion is that both regulatory text and
the regulation's statement of basis and purpose count as part of the "text" on
which a textualist should center her interpretive inquiry. Where a text states
purposes, a textualist will attend to those purposes as part of her commitment to discerning the meaning of the text.
On the reading of Hart and Sacks's theory that I have defended here, this
approach is also purposive. It prescribes reading the regulatory text in light
of its purposes and focuses that inquiry on the authoritative statement of
purposes given by the agency, a focus required by the principle of institutional settlement. If the analogy between enacted statutory purposes and the
agency's statement of basis and purpose holds, then reading the regulation
in light of that agency statement is exactly what their legal process purposivism would direct.
One point of departure, then, will be the case in which the text of the
regulation and the statement of basis and purpose have been well mined by
the court but neither sheds light on the interpretive question posed. At that
point, both the textualist and the 15urposivist will likely redouble their efforts
as to these sources, and then, cautiously, seek to draw inferences about the
meaning from other statutes and regulations.2 65 Here a difference may
emerge in the character of inferences drawn. For a textualist, the crossstatute and cross-regulatory inferences are likely to be semantic ones; for a
purposivist, those inferences would likely have a greater focus on policy
context and consistency with broader values. 266 Thus, in cases in which the
text and the statement of basis and purpose offer no assistance, the account
of purposive regulatory interpretation would need to be specified further and
could take more textualist or purposive variants.

Purposive regulatory interpretation provides a broadly appealing methodology for regulatory interpretation. It recognizes that the regulatory act
includes both the text of the regulation and its accompanying explanatory
material. It therefore makes sense to understand the scope and limits of the
agency's action in view of those materials. By taking the agency's own
statements of the purposes of its regulations as privileged interpretive
265. For an articulation of this as a version of textualism, see Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1, 51 (2007) ("Rather than purporting to exclude
purpose completely where textualist cues point strongly in one direction, a moderate textualist
would canvas all contextual sources available before reaching a final conclusion regarding a
statute's application in the case at hand."). Like Molot, I think that this could just as easily
characterize differences between versions of textualism as the distinction between textualism
and purposivism. See id. at 51 n.142 (suggesting this point).
266. This illustrates the wisdom of the view that the core distinctions between textualism
and purposivism are their different conceptions of context and the types of inferences from
context that should be given priority. See Manning, supra note 134, at 92-96.
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sources, this approach also builds on a deep strain of administrative law's
deference to the agency's own reasoned elaboration of its authorizing legislation. At the same time, given the publicity and accessibility of the agency's
statements, relying on them augments fair notice as to the regulation's
meaning in a way that avoids objections to a purposive approach to statutes.
V.

PURPOSIVISM'S PLACE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Our starting point was that central doctrines of administrative lawfrom Chevron to Seminole Rock and Accardi-requirea principled approach
to regulatory interpretation. This Part argues that the general method of purposive regulatory interpretation described thus far can be adapted to provide
an approach to regulatory interpretation under these doctrines and solve the
puzzles of regulatory interpretation lurking in them. Specifically, under
Chevron, Seminole Rock, and Accardi, courts should ask the same interpretive question: is the proffered interpretation of the regulation one permitted
by the regulation's text and also consistent with its purposes as set forth in
the regulation's statement of basis and purpose as well as its text? That approach not only provides consistency across these doctrines but has
distinctive virtues under each.
A. InterpretingRegulations Under Chevron
The purpose of the Chevron inquiry is to determine whether the agency's
statutory construction is a permissible one. By framing the inquiry as one into
the permissibility of the agency's statutory construction, the agency's action
starts with an important and obvious advantage. Unlike review of a lower
court interpretation of a statute, the agency does not have to convince the reviewing court that its interpretation is the best interpretation-that is, the
interpretation the court would have adopted in the absence of the agency's
construction. 267 The conventional justification for that advantage is that the
agency has been delegated interpretive authority by Congress, or should be
presumed to have been delegated those powers in view of its comparative
268
expertise and accountability.
267. A reviewing court, Chevron directs, is not to "impose its own construction on [a]
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation." Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (footnote omitted);
see also Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate
Review Model of Administrative Law, Il l COLUM. L. REV. 939, 953-72 (2011) (explaining
the emergence and entrenchment of the appellate review model of judicial review of agency
action).
268. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44, 865 (noting agencies' greater expertise and accountability than courts as grounds for deference to agencies); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming
the Legal Fictionof CongressionalDelegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2016 (2011) (noting that
the Chevron Court justified deference primarily on a theory of delegation but also on grounds
of the agency's superior expertise and accountability); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 870-73 (2001) (arguing that presumption of
congressional intent offers best among conventional legal foundations for Chevron deference).
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If the core of Chevron is to grant the agency's construction the advantage of merely having to fit within the realm of permissible constructions
of the statute, it makes sense that a similar presumption would apply when
interpreting the agency's regulation that is subject to review. Specifically,
the deferential grounding of Chevron justifies the reviewing court asking if
there is (1) a permissible construction of the agency's regulation that is also
(2) permissible under the statute.
How could the purposive approach to regulations be adapted to fit under
the Chevron step just revealed-that is, how should a court determine what
is a permissible interpretation of the regulation? My suggestion is that interpretations of a regulation are permissible under Chevron only if they are
(1) permitted by the text of the regulation, and (2) consistent with the regulation's purposes, as set forth in the regulation's statement of basis and
purpose and the regulation's text. To illustrate this visually, the court would
seek to identify the set of interpretations that fall within the shaded portions
of Figure 1.
FIGURE

Interpretations Permitted
by the Regulation's Text

1

Interpretations Consistent with the
Regulation's Purposes as Reflected
inthe Statement of Basis and Purpose and the Regulation's Text

This approach reflects a middle ground. On the one hand, this approach
gives the agency more leeway than if a court were to ask what interpretation
most effectively carried out the purposes of the regulation, or what interpretations constituted the best or most plausible reading of the regulation's text.
The grounds for not adopting these or other more constraining approaches
to regulatory interpretation under Chevron derive from Chevron's own foundations. If Chevron is premised on deference to agency action so long as it is
permissible, then the question should be what qualifies as a permissible interpretation of the regulations at issue, not what is the best or most plausible
construction of the regulations' text or purposes.
On the other hand, this approach would be more constraining than merely asking if an interpretation is permissible under the regulation's text; the
interpretations permitted by the text would be limited further to those consistent with the agency's statement of its purposes. The added consultation
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with the rule's statement of basis and purpose thus narrows, as opposed to
broadens, the set of permitted interpretations of the regulations. Accordingly, it could exclude some interpretations of the regulations that could be the
only interpretations that render it valid under the statute.
Given the deferential grounding of Chevron, perhaps the harder question
is why should interpretations of the regulation be limited to those consistent
with the regulation's purposes, as opposed to allowing all those permitted by
the regulatory text. At one level, the justification for imposing this limitation
is to prevent a strategic bait-and-switch: it prevents the agency from proffering one set of rationales that provide the basis for validating the regulation
and then taking advantage of ambiguities remaining in the regulatory text to
interpret the regulation in ways not consistent with the proffered grounds for
its validity. Put more positively and more broadly, it recognizes that the reasons the agency offers to justify its regulation create commitments to which
the agency owes allegiance. One of the most minimal ways of enforcing that
commitment is to require an interpretation of the regulation that is at least
consistent with the grounds the agency offered to justify it. Because those
grounds are public, interpreting the regulation in light of those grounds
should augment notice of the regulation's meaning.
B. A Solutionfor Seminole Rock

The purposive approach also provides a solution to the puzzle of how a
court is to judge when deference under Seminole Rock to the agency's interpretation of its own regulation is justified. Like Chevron, Seminole Rock
deference is grounded in an attitude of judicial deference to the agency's
expertise, accountability, and a presumption of delegation.269 The basic
premise is that the agency's superiority as a regulator should also grant the
agency considerable room in determining the meaning of its own regulations. But, as John Manning has highlighted, Seminole Rock deference
presents a structural risk that Chevron does not. When a court defers to an
agency's construction of its own regulation under Seminole Rock, it permits
the agency to consolidate lawmaking and law-interpreting functions. 270 At a
practical level, the doctrine creates incentives for the agency to issue broad
and vague regulations and to specify their meaning later, subject only to
plainly erroneous review, 271 undermining rule-of-law values of fair notice.
Short of a wholesale abandonment of the doctrine,2 72 there are two
complementary ways to manage those concerns. The first approach is to
269.

See Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock's Domain, 79 GEO.

WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1459-60 (2011).

270.

Manning, supra note 7, at 682.

271. Id. at 683.
272. See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating that he would be receptive to reconsidering Auer deference and noting
that Auer's defects are fully explored in Manning, supra note 7). If the Court were to abandon
Seminole RocklAuer, the need for a theory of regulatory interpretation will be all the more
pressing.
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restrict Seminole Rock's scope or domain of application to particular
policymaking forms. 273 As Matthew Stephenson and Miri Pogoriler argue,
constricting Seminole Rock's domain just as Mead has constricted the domain
of Chevron's application would enforce the doctrinal bargain that the agency
must either "pay me now" in the form of interpretations adopted through
transparent and deliberative procedures, or "pay me later" by submitting to a
more demanding standard of judicial review.274 On this view, agency
litigation briefs, for instance, would not be eligible for Seminole Rock
deference,2 75 just as they are not eligible for Chevron deference.2 76 By
constricting Seminole Rock's domain, this proposal also corrects the
incentives created by current doctrine, which generally denies Chevron
deference to informal agency interpretations, such as those in agency
litigation briefs, but grants deference under Seminole Rock to agency
interpretations in briefs. 27 7 Despite this logic, as Stephenson and Pogoriler
acknowledge 2 7 1 the Supreme Court has generally accorded Seminole
RockAuer deference to agency litigation briefs, though based on
fair notice
279
concerns it has recently recognized an exception to this practice.
A second and independent strategy is to devote more attention to the
method of regulatory interpretation by which Seminole Rock deference is
273.
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 268, at 900 ("Seminole Rock deference should at a
minimum be subject to the same limitations that apply to the scope of Chevron deference.");
Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 269, at 1484-96 (arguing that Mead's logic for constraining Chevron's scope of application extends to Seminole Rock).
274. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 269, at 1490-91.
275. Id. at 1493.
276. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228-30 (2001) (articulating doctrine under which agency litigation briefs presumptively would not warrant Chevron
deference).
277. See, e.g., Williamson v. Mazda, 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1139 (2011) (relying on Solicitor
General's brief as reflecting the Department of Transportation's "fair and considered judgment
on the matter"); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (deferring to Secretary's construction of regulations taken for first time in the litigation); Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415,
429-30 (1988) (same). The extent to which the Solicitor General has institutional incentives to
represent the agency's construction of the statute is open to question. See Margaret H. Lemos,
The Solicitor General as Mediator Between Court and Agency, 2009 MicH. ST. L. REv. 185,
187.
278. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 269, at 1493 (noting that the Supreme
Court has "frequently extended.., deference to litigation briefs").
279. In 2011, for instance, the Court concluded that agency amicus briefs qualify for
Seminole Rock deference, rejecting the argument that under Mead and Christensen they
should not. See Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2575 n.3 (2011) (relying on brief of
United States); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 883-84 (2011) (rejecting
argument that agency amicus brief was not entitled to deference under Auer, and according
deference to the interpretation contained in the brief). In 2012, in contrast, the Court declined
to grant Seminole RocklAuer deference to an agency's position taken in a litigation brief based
in part on the concern that doing so would undermine fair notice of the regulation's requirements. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166-68 (2012)
(concluding that "general rule" of granting Auer deference to interpretations in litigation briefs
did not apply in these circumstances of the case in view of fair notice concerns).
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triggered. 280 If the interpretive approach increases the requirements for what
counts as a permissible construction of the regulation, deference under Seminole Rock will be triggered less often. The question is how to increase these
requirements in a way that reduces the distinctive risks created by Seminole
Rock (as opposed to just imposing an arbitrary reduction, like deferring only
to agency interpretations issued in the first half of the month).
One way to do that is to pose the same inquiry into regulatory interpretation under Seminole Rock as was just framed under Chevron: namely, is the
agency's interpretation both (1) permissible under the regulation's text, and
(2) consistent with the regulation's purposes as authoritatively established in
the regulatory text and statement of basis and purpose? This approach clearly reduces the set of permissible interpretations of a regulation to those that
satisfy both of these conditions, as illustrated in Figure 1. But it also does so
in a way that enhances fair notice. Regulated parties and regulatory beneficiaries have access to the agency's statements justifying the regulation. By
attending to the level of generality of the purposes offered to justify the
agency's regulation, these parties can gauge the strength of their arguments
that an agency's litigation position is inconsistent with its prior rationales.
More generally, by constraining the scope of permissible interpretations,
this approach provides more notice of the regulation's meaning than simply
looking at what interpretations are textually permissible. It thus reduces the
fair-notice risks Seminole Rock creates.
At the same time, this approach remains consistent with the basic deferential rationale for Seminole Rock in that it allows the agency to determine
how to best interpret the regulation within the set of textually permissible
constructions. This preserves the agency's discretion to deploy its expertise
and heightened accountability within that range.
Adopting a consistent approach to regulatory interpretation under Chevron and Seminole Rock also has independent value. By making these
inquiries parallel, the agency cannot defend its regulations from challenge
under Chevron based on a constrained interpretation that it abandons under
a later Seminole Rock challenge. For instance, it could not assert that its regulations only apply to a range (x and y) for the purposes of defending their
validity under Chevron, and then argue that the regulations have a wider
scope (including x, y, and z) when their enforcement provokes challenge
under Seminole Rock. Adopting a consistent approach to regulatory interpretation avoids this problem. Only those interpretations of the regulation that
are permitted under Chevron would be permissible under Seminole Rock and
vice-versa.
280. Manning frames this approach in terms of the standard of review, suggesting that
Skidmore deference should apply to judicial review of agency interpretations of their own
regulations. See Manning, supra note 7, at 686-90. I address the first-order interpretative
question of how to interpret a regulation assuming that Seminole Rock still provides the
framework of review. Of course, if Seminole Rock were to be abandoned, the general purposivist technique of interpretation sketched in Section IVA could still apply.
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C. A Middle Groundfor Accardi
Perhaps the most important issue under the Accardi principle is how a
court will determine the meaning of the agency's own regulations. Differing
views of the Accardi doctrine justify opposing approaches. The purposive
approach applicable under Chevron and Seminole Rock provides an appealing middle ground.
On the one hand, it is arguable that the central basis for the Accardi doctrine is to provide a mechanism for judicial supervision of the agency, thus
enhancing the agency's capacity to make credible precommitments, as Elizabeth Magill suggests.28 But for Accardi to deliver on this promise, the
court must approach regulatory interpretation under Accardi without giving
much leeway to the agency to shift its interpretation of its regulations ex
post. Otherwise, there would be little force to the judicial monitoring that
Accardi affords. From this perspective, under Accardi, courts should engage
in relatively maximalist regulatory interpretation in the sense that they aim
to unearth the best, not merely a permissible, reading of those precommitments. Indeed, on this view, Seminole Rock's application under Accardi
appears to be out of place. Seminole Rock allows the agency to pivot to another permissible interpretation, 282 undermining the force of judicial
monitoring as well as the scope of the agency's ability to make precommitments.
On the other hand, if the danger in the application of Accardi comes
from courts imposing their preferred constructions on the agency, as
Thomas Merrill worries,

283

then the courts should be limited to the more

minimalist inquiry of whether the agency's construction of its regulation is
permissible, and the application of Seminole Rock deference under Accardi
becomes critical. 284 On this view, Seminole Rock would protect against the
possibility of a court using ambiguity in a regulation to require the agency to
abide by the court's preferred construction. 285 And Seminole Rock deference,
"like Chevron deference, is a vital part of the complex of understandings
28 6
necessary to empower agencies to pursue their own policy preferences.
The purposive approach to regulatory interpretation accommodates both
sets of concerns. To see this, it is first important to recall that under current
law, Seminole Rock applies under Accardi.287 As a result, for practical
281. See, e.g., Magill, supra note 98, at 874 (arguing that Accardi provides agencies with
the capacity to make credible precommitments by permitting third-party enforcement of the
agency's compliance with its rules); see also Merrill, supra note 98, at 615 (evaluating this
possibility).
282. See Merrill, supra note 98, at 615 (noting the tension between Accardi and Seminole Rock on this conception of Accardi's role).
283. See id.
284. See id. (noting that Seminole Rock's application under Accardi makes more sense
on this conception of Accardi's danger).
285. Id. (noting this risk).
286. Id.
287. See supra text accompanying note 102.
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purposes, the scope of the Accardi constraint devolves to the scope of
Seminole Rock's constraint. So our inquiry turns on how well the purposivist
approach under Seminole Rock-whether the interpretation is textually
permissible and consistent with the agency's stated purposes-functions
under Accardi.

The purposive approach, again, strikes a balance. On the one hand, it is
more constraining on the agency than simply evaluating whether the agency's action is permitted by the regulation's text. Indeed, if we take up the
suggestion that at a general level Accardi functions as a precommitment
mechanism, the purposive approach provides a further specification by
giving an account of which commitments the agency must honor. On the
purposive approach, the agency has precommitted to abide not only by the
text of the regulations but also by the agency's public and authoritative
justifications for them. In essence, on the purposive account, Accardi provides third-party enforcement for those commitments.
On the other hand, this approach addresses the concern that Accardi may
invite judicial overreaching. The primary question the court will be asking is
still whether the agency's construction is a permissible one-the Seminole
Rock question. That doctrinal frame provides some protection against a
court imposing its preferred construction on the regulation-at least, that is
not what the court is being asked to do. In this way, the adaptation of the
purposive approach addresses the concerns motivating different conceptions
of interpretation under Accardi. It provides a more robust judicial constraint
on ex post agency interpretation of its own regulations than merely relying
on regulatory text. This enhances the judicial monitoring of agencies. But it
still frames the judicial check so that the court is only trying to keep the
agency within the scope of permissible readings that are consistent with the
central commitments the agency has made in its rulemaking.
D. Administrative Flexibility and the Rule of Law

One objection to this account of regulatory interpretation and its use in
administrative law is that it constrains the flexibility of the agency. Indeed, it
does. Because reasons guide the scope of further application, attention to the
agency's reasons for its regulations will reduce its flexibility to subsequently
interpret or apply its regulation in ways that might comport with the regulation's text but not its justification. And that reduced flexibility can constrain
the scope of an agency's political responsiveness, possibly prompting the ire
of appointed agency heads or the president.
While flexibility has its virtues, it also has costs. One party's flexibility
can be another's unpredictability. In the context of regulatory interpretation,
there are reasons to think that this approach strikes an appealing balance
between flexibility and predictability. First, the flexibility constraint on the
agency is both modest and subject to agency specification. The purposive
approach permits an agency to interpret and reinterpret its rule so long as
those interpretations are consistent with the basis and purpose and the rule's
text. Because the agency creates the rule's statement of basis and purpose, it
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can choose to impose greater or lesser constraints on the rule's scope by the
way in which it crafts the statement of basis and purpose. 288 If an agency (or
a president) seeks to change policy that would be inconsistent with the prior

rule and its statement, the agency has the capacity to do so by conducting a
new rulemaking proceeding. 289 To be sure, a notice-and-comment rulemaking can consume a great deal of agency resources. 290 But it still requires the
coordination of fewer parties with disparate interest than does legislation,

and can be undertaken at the agency's initiative, unlike most shifts in judicial doctrine. If the need for flexibility is truly pressing, the APA gives the
agency leeway to issue new rules outside of notice-and-comment proce-

dure.29' This provides a suitable escape valve where the needs for flexibility
are at their height.

At the same time, the benefits of this constraint on agency flexibility are
real: by using statements of basis and purpose as privileged interpretive

sources, regulatory beneficiaries and regulated parties have more notice of
the agency's policy and its scope than they would gain solely from inquiring

into permissible constructions of the regulation's text. The requirement of
consistency with the statement of basis and purpose contracts, instead of
broadens, the set of acceptable interpretations of the rule.
The virtue of the way the purposive approach balances predictability and
flexibility can be seen by contrasting it with the so-called "one-bite" rule,

which originated in the D.C. Circuit. 292 Under that rule, an agency must initiate a new rulemaking to significantly revise a definitive interpretation of its
288. In this sense, an agency's statement of basis and purpose could also be used as a
form of precommitment strategy. See Magill, supra note 98, at 888. The more detailed the
statement, the more it will lock in the agency's current view of the regulation's scope and
application in subsequent administrations.
289. The flexibility constraint might be thought of as a form of resistance norm. Ernest
A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Re-

view, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1549, 1594 (2000) (characterizing "resistance norms" as norms that
"yield[I to government[B action" though increasing its costs). It does not prohibit the agency
from changing course but forces the agency that seeks to transform its policy in ways not
consistent with its statement of basis and purpose to go through notice-and-comment rulemaking, with its attendant costs and publicity. For a more general consideration of the constraints
on administrative change and an account of its rule-of-law implications, see Randy J. Kozel &
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 112 (2011).
290. See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 3, at 91 (commenting on the resource dependence of agency rulemaking).
291. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2006) (providing exception to notice-and-comment
requirement when agency has good cause to view its procedures as "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest"); see also supra note 4 (noting agency use of direct
final and interim final rules).
292.

52

ADMIN.

See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., DistinguishingLegislative Rules from Interpretive Rules,

L. REv. 547, 561-72 (2000) (tracing development of doctrine and arguing for aban-

doning it); Jon Connolly, Note, Alaska Hunters and the D.C. Circuit: A Defense of Flexible
Interpretive Rulemaking, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 160-74 (2001) (same). For an overview of

the circuit split over the doctrine, see United States v. Magnesium Corp., 616 F.3d 1129, 1139
(10th Cir. 2010) (reporting that the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have adopted the D.C.
Circuit's rule, with the First and Ninth Circuits taking the contrary position).

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 111:355

own rule, even when that interpretation was issued in the form of nonbinding guidance.2 93 The one-bite rule seeks to enhance predictability but does

so at a much higher cost than the purposive approach to interpretation. The
one-bite rule effectively "locks in" an agency's interpretation of its rule,
subject to revision only through a new rulemaking 294-and does so regardless of whether a reinterpretation would be permitted by the regulation's text
and consistent with the statement of basis and purpose. As a result, the rule
provides a disincentive for agencies to offer guidance on the interpretation
of their rules because that guidance will require a notice-and-comment proceeding to revise. 295 Accordingly, it also provides a strong incentive for
agencies to handle inquiries about the meaning of their rules in an informal,
ad hoc, and decentralized way, or through adjudications.2 96
The purposive interpretive approach, in contrast, focuses reliance interests on the rule's text and the agency's original, public justifications, not on
every subsequent interpretation the agency issues. As a result, this approach
enhances the predictability even before an agency has issued guidance interpreting the rule. Under this interpretive method, moreover, the agency is
constrained to issuing interpretations consistent with its original justifications for the rule, which augments notice of the scope of the rule's
application. But, in contrast to the one-bite rule, this interpretive approach
does not undermine the agency's incentive to provide guidance on the agency's current interpretation of its rules; it just delimits a narrower range for
those interpretations. The purposive approach thus has the potential to provide more notice of the regulation's meaning than the one-bite rule while
erecting a more modest constraint on the agency's flexibility.
E. Incentives for Strategic Manipulation

Another potential source of objection is the prospect for strategic manipulation by agencies if courts treated statements of basis and purpose as
privileged interpretive sources. Agencies might provide highly detailed
statements of basis and purpose with the aim of making their policy resistant
to change, issue only obscure statements in the hopes of preserving their
future flexibility, or attempt to smuggle policies into statements of basis and
purpose. While each of these forms of strategic manipulation is a real risk,
existing doctrines of administrative law can manage these risks.
293.

See Alaska Prof'1 Hunters Ass'n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

("When an agency has given its regulation a definitive interpretation, and later significantly
revises that interpretation, the agency has in effect amended its rule, something it may not
accomplish without notice and comment."); Paralyzed Veterans v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d
579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Once an agency gives its regulation an interpretation, it can only
change that interpretation as it would formally modify the regulation itself: through a process
of notice and comment rulemaking").
294. See Connolly, supra note 292, at 174 (explaining the "lock in" consequence of the
one-bite rule).

295.
296.

See id. at 170.
See Pierce, supra note 292, at 571; Connolly, supra note 292, at 169-70.
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First, in anticipation of courts taking a purposive approach to regulatory
interpretation, an agency might attempt to entrench as much policy as possible, for instance, by issuing highly detailed statements of basis and purpose,
perhaps in anticipation of a presidential transition. 297 The response to this
risk is straightforward: so long as the procedural protections for notice-andcomment rulemaking are enforced, which I address below, 298 this prospect is
no more problematic than other pervasive forms of agency entrenchment of
policy, and it also carries their benefits. 299 Establishing policy is part of the
prerogative of government. Providing a relatively more detailed statement of
the purposes of the regulation, with the hope that it will guide its further
application, stands on the same footing as other ways in which an agency
can establish policies that are equally hard, if not harder, to change, such as
in the text of a legislative rule itself.
Second, consider the opposite consequence: the purposive approach to
regulatory interpretation could encourage an agency to be less explicit in its
statement of basis and purpose in order to preserve its future flexibility. The
agency's rule, however, will still have to survive hard-look review and the
demand for agency reason-giving. Those administrative law doctrines continue to provide a strong check on this strategic obscurantism. As long as
those doctrines continue to operate, the incentive toward obscurantism will
be checked by the need to be explicit about the policy adopted and its basis.
Third, as became clear in recent debates over agencies' power to
preempt state law, agencies have been tempted to smuggle important policies into their statements of basis and purpose that were not previously
subjected to the notice-and-comment process. 3°° Here again, the purposive
approach depends upon enforcement of the procedural core of notice-andcomment rulemaking: that the public has an adequate opportunity to comment
on the agency's proposed policy. 01 Without enforcement of those procedural
requirements, the fair notice benefits of the purposivist approach will be
diminished.
297. For a helpful treatment of modes of agency entrenchment prior to presidential transitions, see Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel
Before a New PresidentArrives, 78 N.YU. L. REv. 557, 561, 594 (2003).
298. See infra text accompanying notes 302-311 (discussing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.
555 (2009), and the logical outgrowth doctrine).

299. See Mendelson, supra note 297, at 599-605, 616-52 (highlighting costs as well as
benefits of policy entrenchment prior to presidential transitions).
300.

See Sharkey, FederalismAccountability, supra note 37, at 2132, 2138-42 (describ-

ing the FDA's inclusion of a preemption statement in its preamble despite having disclaimed
any potential preemptive effect in its notice of proposed rulemaking, and cataloging similar
actions by the FDA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration); see also Manning, supra note 7, at 690 n.372 (warning that overreliance on statements of basis and purpose
by courts gives incentives to agencies to "slip" desired policy into statements of basis and
purpose rather than including them in the text of regulations).
301. See Manning, supra note 7, at 690 n.372 (noting that with judicial reliance on
statements of basis and purpose for interpretation, courts should police the availability of these
statements for comment on their material aspects).
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The FDA's statement on preemption considered by the Supreme Court in
Wyeth v. Levine" 2 provides an excellent illustration of both an agency's

temptation to announce new policies in its statement of basis and purpose
and an effective judicial response. The FDA took the position in its statement of basis and purpose that its authorizing statute, and thus its regulations,
preempted state law governing the content and form of prescription drug labels. The authorizing statute, the FDA surmised in its statement of basis and
purpose, establishes "both a 'floor' and a 'ceiling,' so [the] FDA approval of
labeling preempts conflicting or contrary State law."3 ° 3 The agency, however, had not provided any notice of this interpretation when it issued its notice
of proposed mlemaking. 3°4 Quite the opposite, as the Court in Wyeth pointed
out, in its notice, the agency had explained that the rule did "not contain
policies that have federalism implications or that preempt State law."305 The
states and interested parties were afforded no "notice or opportunity for
comment" 30 6 on the FDA's preemption position included in its statement of
basis and purpose. The Court rejected the agency's statement, reasoning that
"[t]he agency's views on state law are inherently suspect in light of this
procedural failure. ' 30 7 Wyeth thus reveals that the opportunity to comment
applies to important policies set forth in statements of basis and purpose,
checking the agency's incentive to include previously undisclosed policy in
statements of basis and purpose.30 8
This objection emphasizes an important feature of the purposive account: a condition for reliance on statements of basis and purpose as guides
to interpretation is the court's enforcement of notice-and-comment proce302. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
303.
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 575 (quoting 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934-35 (Jan. 24, 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
304.

Id. at 577.

305. Id.
306. See id.
307. Id.
308. The "logical outgrowth" doctrine also has the resources to enforce disclosure. When
an agency is engaged in informal rulemaking, its final rule must be a "logical outgrowth" of
the proposed rule published in the § 553(b) notice. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F2d
741, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The logical outgrowth doctrine seeks to ensure meaningful participation in the notice-and-comment process. See Horsehead Res. Dev. Co. v. Browner, 16 F.3d
1246, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In making this determination, courts may evaluate whether the
agency provided meaningful notice of positions taking in its statement of basis and purpose.
See, e.g., Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F3d
1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding a final rule was not a logical outgrowth of the proposed
rule when the proposed rule suggested that the agency was considering a minimum air velocity standard for point-feed regulators and the final rule's statement of basis and purpose
provided a maximum air velocity); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta, 427 F Supp. 2d 7, 16 (D.D.C.
2006) (finding no logical outgrowth when the final rule's statement of basis and purpose established categorical presumptions concerning the confidentiality of information submitted to the
agency while the proposed rule contemplated nonbinding presumptions). Policing whether
policies in a statement of basis and purpose are a logical outgrowth of an agency's proposals
falls within core judicial capacities.
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dures. Policing administrative procedure is, however, a core judicial capacity, well honed through years of application under the APA.
F. Preemption and the Legal Status of Statements of Basis and Purpose
One further and related worry is whether this methodology grants statements of basis and purpose a legal status they do not warrant. Understanding
this objection clarifies the legal status of statements of basis and purpose. It
also reveals implications of the purposive approach for the debate over how
an agency should express its view that its regulations preempt state law.
As to the legal status of statements of basis and purpose, the purposive
approach does not conflate them with the regulation's text. If the statement
of basis and purpose contradicts the regulation's text, the text trumps because it is the legally binding aspect of the regulation.3 °9 But the purposive
approach still takes the statement of basis and purpose to be privileged
among sources of interpretation other than the text; for instance, as part of
the rulemaking product, it is privileged over later-issued policy statements
and interpretative rules suggesting the meaning or application of the regulation. Those post hoc statements are at best candidates for deference after the
court has concluded, based on analysis of the regulation's text read in light
of the statement of basis and purpose, that the regulation permits those constructions.
With this clarification in mind, it is worth addressing the implications of
this approach for the debate over the agency's power and means to preempt
state law. In debates over regulatory preemption, agency claims of the
preemptive effect of their regulations in their litigation briefs, on the one
hand, and in their statements of basis and purpose, on the other, have been
treated as equivalent.31 0 Taking the purposive approach, however, there is an
important difference. So long as an agency does not short-circuit the principles of notice-and-comment rulemaking addressed above in discussing
Wyeth, an agency's explanation of the preemptive effect of its regulations in
its statement of basis and purpose should guide judicial construction of the
meaning of the regulation. A litigation brief, in contrast, is at best a candidate for deference once the regulation has been found ambiguous as to its
preemptive scope.3 1'
309.

See supra note 200 (discussing Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 557 U.S. 519, 531

(2009)). In FertilizerInstitute v. EPA, for instance, the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that
the EPA's interpretation of the term "release" contained in the regulation's statement of basis
and purpose was a legislative rule, and therefore was procedurally invalid. See 935 F.2d 1303,
1308 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The court reasoned that "an agency's action is deemed ... legislative
when the agency intends to create new ... duties" and not when an agency's action "has the
effect of creating new duties:' Id. (citation omitted). "Accordingly, the fact that the preamble
Id.
I"
may affect how parties act does not make the rule legislative...
310. See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 39, at 496.
311. Perhaps it should not even be that. See text accompanying notes 98-102 (discussing
the view that Seminole Rock should not apply to agency briefs among other forms of informal

agency action).
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There still might be special justification for prohibiting an agency from
making claims regarding preemption in their statements of basis and purpose, as President Obama's recent memorandum directs.312 For instance,
that position might be grounded in a special distrust of the efficacy of notice-and-comment protections in the preemption context, or a view that the
federalism implications of preemption are so significant as to warrant a
clear-statement rule. What is important for the purposive account, however,
is that the reasons for marginalizing the agency's statement of basis and
purpose are tied to the particulars of agency preemption, not a crosscutting
suspicion of these statements as grounds for regulatory interpretation or of
the efficacy of notice-and-comment protections.3" 3
CONCLUSION

Over more than a half-century, courts and commentators have been knit
in debate over the proper method for interpreting statutes. The "age of statutes,' 3 14 however, has decisively given way to an era of regulation, with
notice-and-comment rules providing a ubiquitous source of law in the contemporary American state. These regulations remain, however, virtually
unnoticed guests at the interpretive table. Our central doctrines of administrative law depend on how regulations are interpreted. But how courts do so
has triggered little interest, and courts still lack a considered approach. It is
time for the interpretation of regulations to take a place in interpretive debates and in the development of administrative law.
To invigorate that debate, this Article argues that the strongest case for
legal process purposivism may be as applied to regulations. Administrative
law requires production of explanatory materials by agencies when they
create regulations. Courts currently use those materials primarily to assess the
validity of regulations. But they hold promise for the interpretation of regulations as well. Because agencies must issue these statements for their
regulations to be valid, and the validity of regulations depends on the reasons
offered to justify them, it makes sense to interpret the text of regulations in
light of the justifications provided for them. By using these statements as a
privileged source for interpretation, this approach allocates deference to the
agency's exercise of reasoned discretion. At the same time, the approach holds
312. President Obama's memorandum directs the heads of executive departments not to
include "in regulatory preambles statements that the department or agency intends to preempt
State law through the regulation except where the preemption provisions are also included in
the codified regulation." Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Preemption (May 20, 2009), available at http://

www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-regarding-preemption.

The

memorandum prohibits the type of preemptive statement the FDA made in its statement of
basis and purpose at issue in Wyeth. See id.; cf Sharkey, FederalismAccountability, supra note
37, at 2179-80 (arguing that courts should force agencies to engage in preemption decisions
by conditioning deference on whether preemption statements have gone through notice-and-

comment procedures).
313.
314.

See Metzger, supra note 37, at 2103.
See CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 1.
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the agency to the grounds it offered to justify its actions, augmenting fair notice of the meaning of regulations. This general approach to regulatory
interpretation is also adaptable to the need for regulatory interpretation in
administrative law. When faced with a regulation in a Chevron challenge, as
well as in applications of Seminole Rock and Accardi, the court should ask
whether the proffered construction is a permissible reading of the regulatory
text and consistent with the agency's justification for it. This additional requirement of consistency with the agency's justification restricts the
agency's flexibility to reinterpret its regulations, but does so in the service of
fair notice.
This approach also suggests new promise for purposivism. At least as a
theory of judicial statutory interpretation, purposivism has been in retreat in
the face of textualist critiques. Identifying the scope of legal process purposivism's commitment to positive sources illuminates how it can serve as a
model for regulatory interpretation. More important, given the prominence
and centrality of regulations in contemporary law, a purposive approach to
interpreting regulations constitutes a significant foothold for purposivism,
and a new day for Hart and Sacks's theory.
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